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ADMINISTRATIVE DISSENTS

SHARON B. JACOBS*
ABSTRACT
Commissioners, like judges, dissent. They do so at length, with
vigor, and with persistence. Yet while separate judicial decisions are
the subject of a rich literature, their administrative counterparts
have long languished in obscurity. A closer look is warranted, however, because studying administrative dissent can enhance our
understanding of internal agency operations as well as the relationships between agencies and other actors. This Article presents the
results of an original review of separate statements at the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dating back four decades. It uses these findings to move
beyond two common generalizations about administrative commissions: that commissions act largely by consensus and that the myriad
independent commissions across the federal bureaucracy are essentially homogenous. This Article also tells a larger institutional
story about the utility of separate statements in constraining bureaucratic discretion. Commissioner dissents and concurrences ameliorate the principal-agent problem inherent in delegations of legislative
authority by providing both Congress and the President with better
information about the preferences and behavior of individual commissioners. Dissents and concurrences can also improve decisionmaking quality within the agency, thereby minimizing the risk of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank
Fred Bloom, William Boyd, Ann Carlson, Ming Chen, Jacob Gersen, Jon Michaels, Helen
Norton, David Spence, Glen Staszewski, Phil Weiser, and the participants in the Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable and the Duke/Colorado Works-in-Progress Symposium
for helpful comments and suggestions. A special thank you to David Gasvoda, Hannah Oakes,
Krishan Prasad, and Michelle White for excellent research assistance. All mistakes are my
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arbitrariness. An emerging judicial doctrine of “deliberation-forcing”
as a component of “arbitrary and capricious” review can enhance this
effect, and this Article proposes that similar “deliberation-forcing”
inform judicial review of agency interpretations of law under Chevron. This Article concludes by proposing a framework in which to
assess the costs and benefits of separate statements and suggesting
avenues for further research.
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INTRODUCTION
“This order ... ‘ignor[es] the elephant in the living room.’”
—FERC Commissioner Bill Massey, Dissenting in Part 1
“[T]he lessons we learned from the Three Mile Island accident ...
seem to have been forgotten by the present Commission.”
—Separate Views of NRC Commissioner Asselstine 2
“[I]t is sad to witness the FCC’s unprecedented attempt to replace
... freedom with government control.”
—Dissenting Statement of FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai 3

The administrative state, with its “vast hallways,”4 twisted warrens, and dark corners, holds mysteries even for those who inhabit
and study it. Scholars have mined the bureaucracy’s rich seams for
decades, and yet new discoveries are regularly unearthed.5 This
Article sheds light on one such little-studied feature of administrative decision-making: published dissents and concurrences on
multimember commissions.
Consider the following examples:
" A NRC Commissioner dissented from a broad Final Statement of Policy on Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power
1. Removing Obstacles to Increased Electric Generation and Natural Gas Supply in the
Western United States, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,858, 15,865 (Mar. 14, 2001) (Massey, Comm’r, dissenting in part).
2. Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline
to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning, 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6984 (proposed Mar. 2, 1987)
(to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
3. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5921 (2015) (Pai,
Comm’r, dissenting) (majority adopting proposed rule).
4. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM . L. REV. 1789, 1791-94 (2015) (noting ways in which the modern rulemaking process
deviates from traditional paths); Elizabeth Magill, Annual Review of Administrative Law—
Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 859, 860-62 (2009) (identifying the
phenomenon of agency “self-regulation,” or voluntary constraint of discretion); Jennifer Nou,
Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1782-1803 (2013)
(proposing that agencies shield their decisions from presidential oversight through such
innovative strategies as institutional coalition-building and variations in policy making form).
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Plants, asserting that the policy was inadequately protective
of public safety and that the Commission’s posture for the past
thirty years had been reactive and too deferential to industry.6
" A FERC Commissioner suggested that the majority’s understanding of the statutory phrase “withheld approval for more
than 1 year after the filing of an application” as covering cases
in which approval is denied was contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute.7
" A FCC Commissioner dissented from a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking imposing “net neutrality” requirements because
he believed the Commission lacked statutory authority to
promulgate the rule.8
" A FERC Commissioner’s dissent from the issuance of a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on the regulation of fast-responding
resources in wholesale markets found the record inadequate
to support the Commission’s proposal and chastised the majority for not having begun the rulemaking process with a Notice
of Inquiry or an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.9
Such formal, public expressions of disagreement on administrative commissions are commonplace. Yet while their judicial
counterparts are the subject of a rich literature,10 administrative
6. See Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,643, 24,247-48
(July 1, 1986) (Asselstine, Comm’r, dissenting) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
7. Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,476 (Nov. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Order No. 689]
(Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50, 380).
8. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5921 (Pai, Comm’r,
dissenting).
9. See Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets,
76 Fed. Reg. 11,177, 11,186-87 (proposed Feb. 17, 2011) (Spitzer, Comm’r, dissenting in part)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
10. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH . L. REV. 133,
134 (1990) (recommending greater restraint from judges in issuing separate opinions); Lani
Guinier, The Supreme Court 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122
HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-16 (2008) (arguing that judicial dissent can stimulate greater public
participation in policy and governance); Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a
“Right” to Dissent?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 684-85 (1999) (exploring possible constitutional
foundations for a judicial right to dissent); Mark Tushnet, Response, Incentives and the
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dissents and concurrences have largely escaped notice. Even foundational works on independent commissions fail to account for separate statements.11 Yet separate statements themselves, and the
agency procedures that govern them, are no mere quirks of the
administrative process. Rather, they are a fundamental feature of
agency decision-making.
Given that separate statements are relatively commonplace across
agencies, it is puzzling that they have escaped scrutiny. One possible explanation for this oversight is that commissioner separate
statements can be difficult to locate. Each agency has its own procedures governing the publication and availability of these statements, and thus visibility varies. But a more likely explanation is
that when it comes to administrative dissent, academia’s blind spot
is simply the latest exemplar of a larger phenomenon: until recently,
administrative law scholarship has been outward looking, focusing
primarily on the relationship between agencies and other actors.
Scholars have been alternately preoccupied with doctrines of judicial

Supreme Court, 78 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1300, 1303-06 (2010) (assessing the effects of anonymous, as well as attributed, dissents and concurrences on the Supreme Court); Patricia M.
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1371-77 (1995) (exploring the reasons judges write separately); Diane P. Wood,
When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a MultiMember Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1445, 1451-75 (2012) (identifying categories of dissent and
describing the cost-benefit analysis judges undertake in deciding whether to write a concurrence or dissent).
11. See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN , REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1955); WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Paul W.
MacAvoy ed., 1970).

2017]

ADMINISTRATIVE DISSENTS

547

review on the one hand,12 and presidential control of administrative
agencies on the other.13
Increasingly, however, contemporary administrative law scholars
have turned away from theories of external control to study agencies’ internal dynamics. Recent articles have focused, for example,
on the role of agency heads in coordinating agency operations,14
12. For a sample of articles on judicial review of administrative action, see generally, for
example, Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 555 (2011) (exploring the impacts of standards of judicial review on presidential
agendas); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military
Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005) (arguing for more searching review of the Executive’s
factual determinations in wartime); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589 (2014)
(advocating more stringent judicial review for agency factual determinations not subject to
executive oversight); and Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look”
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (defending judicially imposed explanation
requirements as tools to ameliorate courts’ informational disadvantage vis-à-vis agencies).
With respect to Chevron deference in particular, or judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes they are authorized to administer, there are nearly four hundred law
review articles available on Westlaw with Chevron in their title. Notable efforts include David
J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (proposing that the level of judicial deference be tailored to the identity of the agency decision
maker); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549 (2009) (criticizing
Chevron for failing to take into account the realities of legislative behavior); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO . L.J. 833 (2001) (exploring the scope
of Chevron’s application); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing that Chevron deference can be distilled down to a
single reasonableness inquiry); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006) (arguing for a more expansive understanding of when Chevron deference is appropriate).
13. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO .
WASH . L. REV. 533 (1989) (discussing the constitutionality of executive oversight of administration); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001)
(arguing that the President has become the dominant political actor vis-à-vis the administrative state); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 696 (2007) (making the case that the President should
merely oversee the operation of the administrative state).
More recently, articles on the relationship between the President and the bureaucracy have
focused on specific instruments of presidential control, notably the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). See, e.g.,
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM . L. REV. 1260 (2006); Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA
and Beyond, 103 GEO . L.J. 259 (2015); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era
of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2006); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a
Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016); Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and
Out, 63 ADMIN . L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION ) 135 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015).
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power allocations within agencies,15 the effects of partisanship on
agency decision-making,16 internal agency restraints,17 and the exercise of agency enforcement discretion.18 These articles have taken an
inductive approach, drawing on actual observations about the way
agencies operate to formulate broader conclusions about the systems, both political and legal, that govern them.
This Article contributes both to the established literature on external agency constraints and to the growing literature on internal
agency dynamics. Administrative dissents and concurrences are
worthy of study for several reasons. First, a more complete picture
of this practice reminds us that two common generalizations in administrative law—that commissions act by consensus and that the
myriad independent commissions are largely homogenous—are simply that: generalizations. The idea of consensus has been bolstered
by a tendency, both inside and outside the academy, to refer generally to “the Agency” or “the Commission,” labels which suggest
unitary actors. In reality, to paraphrase Ken Shepsle’s famous observation about Congress, administrative commissions are a “they,”
not an “it.”19 In looking beyond majority commission opinions, we
find a richer world of disagreement and compromise than is visible
from without.
A study of separate statements also reminds us that agencies
are heterogeneous. Many so-called independent agencies do share
common features including, typically, multimember leadership enjoying for-cause removal protection.20 But studying dissenting and
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032 (2011).
16. See, e.g., William Kovacic, Politics, Hyper-Partisanship, and Regulatory Agency Leadership, 10 GEO . J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016);
Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571 (2016).
19. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON . 239, 244-45 (1992) (explaining that the idea of legislative intent
is incoherent because Congress is composed of individual members with heterogeneous preferences).
20. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623-30 (1935) (drawing a distinction between executive officers, who may be removed by the President at will, and independent agency commissioners, who enjoy more protections); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW : THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 21 (7th ed. 2014) (“[A] so-called
independent commission, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), would typically be
headed by a set of commissioners rather than by a single administrator.”).
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concurring opinions at three commissions—the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—
revealed stark differences in culture, procedure, and output.21 For
example, while some commissions produce relatively combative dissents, at others, restraint is the order of the day.22 While some commissions rely on numerous, and publicly available, internal rules to
govern the issuance of separate statements, others operate based
largely on long-standing norms.23 And while the patterns of dissent
and concurrence at some commissions suggest partisan decisionmaking, at other commissions politics appear largely irrelevant.24
More broadly, separate statements can enlarge our understanding
of a fundamental and persistent critique facing administrative governance: the bureaucracy’s legitimacy deficit.25 Administrative law
proposes two primary solutions to the legitimacy problem. First,
agencies might be disciplined by subjugating them to electorally accountable actors: Congress and the President.26 By reducing informational barriers between agencies and their political principals,
separate statements can increase the effectiveness of such oversight.
21. For articles discussing some of these idiosyncratic features, see Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18
(2010) (suggesting that nontraditional criteria determine the degree of an agency’s independence); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 784-824 (2013) (cataloging differences among independent
agencies); and Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 59 AM . J. POL. SCI. 971,
972-75 (2015) (identifying appointment restrictions and availability of political review as two
key indicia of agency independence).
22. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part I.B.1.
24. See infra Part I.B.2.
25. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV.
565, 589-97 (2014) (describing the administrative state’s legitimacy deficit). Some have even
attacked the administrative state as unconstitutional. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1-7 (2014); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
26. See JERRY L. MASHAW , CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION : THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (2012) (arguing that the political
branches exert greater control over administrative agencies than do the courts); Jacob E.
Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 186 n.3
(2014) (“[P]olitical accountability ... is the very premise of administrative discretion in all its
forms.” (omission in original) (quoting Newman v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2000));
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM . L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) (“Each agency is subject to control relationships
with some or all of the three constitutionally named branches.”).
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But the job of checking agency discretion need not be performed
exclusively by external actors. As scholars and courts increasingly
acknowledge, independent agencies can be controlled from within as
well as from without.27 In other words, we might compensate for the
absence of administrative electoral oversight by submitting agencies
to a variety of internal checking mechanisms—some reviewable by
courts, some not—to ensure rational decision-making.28 By modifying their approach to the review of agency separate statements,
courts can promote internal agency deliberation, thereby checking
arbitrariness from within.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is both descriptive and
analytical, focusing on broader lessons from original empirical work
on commissioner separate statements. That work involved a review
of dissents and concurrences from rulemaking decisions at FERC
and the NRC over the past four decades. Anonymous interviews
with current and former Commissioners and staff at those two
Agencies and at the FCC fleshed out the process by which these separate statements are generated and provided context for significant
findings. Part I sets out the results of this review in context,
explaining the potential for the findings to disrupt existing generalizations about commission consensus and commission homogeneity.
Parts II and III turn to the import of separate statements for
administrative law’s foundational conundrum: how to check undesirable behavior by unelected bureaucrats. Part II proposes that
27. There is actually nothing novel about the basic premise that agency structure and
process, backed up by judicial review, can reduce or even eliminate arbitrary decision-making.
Indeed, this was one of the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA),
which sought to achieve “reasonable uniformity and fairness in administrative procedures.”
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 6
(1947).
28. Lisa Bressman is a modern champion of this approach, arguing that accountability
theory is overblown and that constitutional principles should be understood as primarily
concerned about “decisionmaking that reflects narrow interests rather than public purposes.”
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (2004). Such decisions are “arbitrary,” Bressman argues, because
they are inconsistent with principles of good governance. Id. at 1660-61; see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (2003) (arguing that we have become too fixated on political
accountability and should refocus our efforts on preventing administrative arbitrariness);
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 142 (2010) (suggesting that disparate
judicial standards for review of agency action be consolidated into a single “reasonableness”
standard).
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these statements facilitate congressional oversight of administrative
commissions, thus mitigating the problem of bureaucratic drift. It
also examines the utility of separate statements for presidential
monitoring. In Part III, the Article shifts its attention to the role of
separate statements in disciplining internal agency decision-making. It argues that courts can enhance such internal mechanisms by
showing special solicitude for arguments raised by dissenting commissioners when reviewing agency action under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard.29 This judicial “deliberation-forcing,”
Part III concludes, could be expanded to review of agency interpretations of statutory text under Chevron.30
Justice William Brennan once proclaimed that “[t]he right to dissent is one of the great and cherished freedoms that we enjoy by
reason of the excellent accident of our American births.”31 This much
seems axiomatic. But it tells us nothing about the extent to which
the exercise of that right in any given context is good policy. Part IV
therefore proposes a new normative framework for understanding
the institutional and societal benefits and drawbacks of commissioner dissents and concurrences. Part V concludes.
I. UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE DISSENT
Judicial opinions dominate academic thinking on the practice of
published separate statements. A deep literature has taken judicial
dissent as its subject, exploring the normative bases for the practice,
and alternately celebrating and criticizing “great dissenters” such
as Justices John Marshall Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes.32 By
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (explaining that reviewing courts shall hold unlawful any
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
30. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(establishing a deferential two-step process for review of agency interpretations of statutes
they are authorized to administer).
31. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 438 (1986).
32. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory
of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283; Tushnet, supra note 10, at 1303-06. Many of these
treatments are authored by the judges themselves. Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2235-36 (1996); see, e.g., Michael Boudin,
Friendly, J., Dissenting, 61 DUKE L.J. 881, 896-99 (2012); Brennan, supra note 31, at 435-38;
Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 134; Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say
Concurral, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 601, 602 (2012); Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion,
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contrast, separate statements by administrative decision makers
have been largely ignored.33 These dissents and concurrences appear
frequently in the published opinions of independent regulatory
commissions, in some cases at the same rate as in the courts.34
Curiously, many appear in rulemaking documents, including final
rules. Some even accompany agency guidance.
Published separate statements are not a necessary feature of
decision-making, even in those governance systems that permit
dissent in other formats. In most civil law countries, for example,
judicial decisions on multimember courts are issued as single,
unsigned documents.35 In the United States, legislative dissent may
be documented in legislative history but does not accompany the
final bill. Presidents may object to aspects of legislation in signing
statements, but these too are made available separately.
Administrative commissions follow the Anglo-American judicial
practice of issuing written concurrences and dissents and of integrating them into final decisions. The practice can be traced to the
earliest days of modern independent commissions. In 1887, the
same year that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was
established, Commissioner William Ralls Morrison dissented from
an adjudicatory order.36 It is perhaps unsurprising that the judicial
practice of writing separately made its way onto administrative
1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 33-35; Wood, supra note 10, at 1448.
33. But see Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power
of Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (2010). Ho compared the results of an expert survey asking
about FCC Commissioner philosophies, with an analysis of Commission voting records. Id.
at 335-36. However, Ho did not focus on either the process for generating separate statements
or the content of those statements. See id. at 344-45.
34. At FERC, for example, the separate opinion rate, averaged over the agency’s lifetime,
is approximately 3 percent. Data on file with author. This rate is roughly comparable to that
on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity
Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
801, 815 & tbl.1 (2010) (deriving a dissent rate of approximately 2.99 percent on the D.C.
Circuit between 1998 and 2009). Richard Posner, William Landes, and Lee Epstein cite a 2.6
percent dissent rate between 1990 to 2007 on the courts of appeal more generally (the figure
is higher when considering only published opinions) and a concurrence rate of 0.6 percent. See
Wood, supra note 10, at 1451 (citing Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Approach, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106-07 (2011)).
35. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 1607, 1609
(2005); see also MARK TUSHNET, I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME
COURT CASES, at xiii (2008) (noting countries that ban published dissent in various contexts).
36. See Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 86, 101 (1887) (Morrison, Comm’r, dissenting) (“I
dissent from the views of my associates.”).
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commissions, given that many early members of such commissions,
Morrison included, were attorneys by training.37
The practice of writing separately is especially unsurprising when
it comes to administrative adjudications, which in many ways mirror cases tried in courts. Curiously, however, commissioners also
dissent from quasi-legislative issuances (more commonly known as
rules). Commissioners from a wide array of government agencies
engage in the practice, including members of the FCC, the FERC,
the NRC, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the FTC,
and even the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC).38 Separate statements are appended to proposed39 and
final rules,40 to early procedural documents such as Notices of Inquiry and Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking,41 to Grants or
Denials of Petitions for Rehearing, and to Orders on Rehearing.42
Perhaps most surprising of all, commissioners sometimes dissent
from interpretive rules and other informal guidance documents
(where clarity and uniformity would appear to be paramount).43
Notwithstanding the widespread nature of this phenomenon, it
has largely escaped academic and professional notice.44 This Section
therefore attempts to dispel some of the obscurity surrounding
37. See, e.g., MORRISON, William Ralls, (1824-1909), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S.
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M001000 [https://perma.
cc/U5TS-2LSM].
38. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 237-41.
39. See, e.g., Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments
Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning, 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6984 (proposed Mar.
2, 1987 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50)).
40. See, e.g., Order No. 689, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,476 (Nov. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Order
No. 689] (Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50, 380).
41. See, e.g., Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of Intent to Consult Under
Section 202(a), 63 Fed. Reg. 66,158, 66,160-64 (Nov. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Section 202(a)
Notice for Regional Transmission Organizations] (Bailey, Comm’r, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
42. See, e.g., Separate Statement of Comm’r Moeller, dissenting, attached to Order
Denying Rehearing on Update of FERC’s Fee Schedule for Annual Charges for the Use of
Governmental Lands, 129 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2009) [hereinafter Order Denying Rehearing, No.
RM09-6-001].
43. See, e.g., Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,643, 24,64748 (July 1, 1986) (Asselstine, Comm’r, dissenting) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (final
policy statement).
44. Due to the siloed nature of administrative practice, even commissioners and agency
staff are frequently unaware of how the opinion drafting process operates at other commissions.
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commissioner separate statements. It does so by taking a close look
at the phenomenon at two independent commissions: FERC and the
NRC. For each Agency, not only were all commissioner separate
statements from rulemaking decisions collected and reviewed, but
also the internal procedures governing the drafting, circulation, and
publication of those statements were investigated. In addition, this
Section incorporates findings from earlier studies of voting behavior
at the FCC and from research into the procedures for separate statements at that Agency.45
FERC and the NRC were selected for detailed review for several
reasons. First, both are energy agencies. Although their mandates
and authority are distinct in important ways,46 the comparison
demonstrates the diversity in commission practices and procedures
among federal commissions—even those that operate in related
policy areas. Second, Daniel Ho has determined that, among independent commissions with rulemaking authority, FERC has one of
the highest rates of separate opinions, while the NRC has one of the
lowest.47 This discrepancy tees up important questions about the
effect of internal processes on the rates of published separate statements. Third, on the spectrum of regulatory subject matter, energy
is considered to be relatively complex, and thus we might expect
agencies operating in this area to receive significant deference from
45. A more detailed assessment of the FCC was not undertaken, in part because data on
voting at that Commission already exists. See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control:
the Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 8 tbl.1 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n
Annual Meetings, Paper No. 73, 2007), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2219&context=alea [https://perma.cc/L3C6-WJWA]; see also Keith S. Brown & Adam
Candeub, Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique 5,
13, 33 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 06-04, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100125 [https://perma.
cc/7EQL-BAM8] (relying on a data set covering thirty-six years of FCC voting to estimate the
impact of politics and other factors on commissioner-voting behavior). Nevertheless, the
juxtaposition of the FCC’s markedly higher output of separate statements is illuminating, if
only as a reminder of commission heterogeneity in this area.
46. While both Commissions are responsible for “energy” regulatory activities, their specific jurisdictions as well as their missions and approach are fundamentally distinct. See
JAMES H. MCGREW , FERC: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 (2d ed. 2009); About
NRC, NRC, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html [https://perma.cc/DLU5-FWHS].
47. See Ho, supra note 45, at 8 tbl.1. Ho measured the rates of dissent and concurrence
over a period of years for “major” federal independent regulatory commissions. Id. at 7-9.
Unlike this project, however, Ho did not explore the content of the separate statements themselves.
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reviewing courts. I was curious to see if the presence of dissenting
opinions in commission orders upset this expectation. Finally, the
subject of energy generation, transmission and use has become
increasingly politicized, and studying FERC and NRC decision-making promised clues about politicization on the independent commissions responsible for federal energy governance.
The methodology employed was relatively straightforward. For
each Agency, decisions since the beginning of operations under their
current names were searched, yielding approximately forty years of
decisions for each commission.48 The processes and procedures governing writing and issuances of separate statements were also investigated. Because few accounts of agency practices in this area are
available, academic or otherwise,49 this Part draws on anonymous
interviews with current and former commissioners and staff to
supplement its descriptions.
This study captured only concurrences and dissents from rulemaking documents (including informal guidance). If the goal is to
capture dissent from agency policy making, the focus on rulemaking
will necessarily be underinclusive, because agency policy making
also takes place via adjudication.50 However, the narrower focus on
rulemaking was elected for two reasons. First, it created a manageable set of orders for review. More importantly, published separate
statements in agency rulemakings pose a greater puzzle than do
separate opinions in adjudications. Because published separate
48. For FERC, decisions since it began operations as the successor agency to the Federal
Power Commission on October 1, 1977, were examined for the presence of separate statements. Decisions from the NRC after it succeeded the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on
January 19, 1975, were also reviewed.
49. The best comprehensive data on individual commission approaches comes from a
seventeen-year-old article by Marshall Breger (a former chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States) and Professor Gary Edles. See generally Marshall J. Breger
& Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal
Agencies, 52 ADMIN . L. REV. 1111 (2000). Breger and Edles found that most, but not all,
commissions permit the issuance of separate opinions. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), for example, do
not allow them. Id. at 1246-47, 1270-71.
50. Some agencies use adjudicative policy making more than others. The classic example
of an agency that relies heavily on adjudication as opposed to rulemaking is the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which has largely declined to use rulemaking to make general
policy. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN . L. REV. 163, 170 (1985); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the
NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 411-13 (2010).
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opinions are common on multimember courts going back to the
American judiciary’s earliest days (and because issuing seriatim
opinions was the modus operandi of English courts dating back
nearly a thousand years), it is unsurprising that agency adjudicators adopted the practice.51 By contrast, as discussed above, concurrences and dissents attached to quasi-legislative issuances are
without historical precedent, at least in the United States, perhaps
due to the need for settlement in the promulgation of prospective
general law.
Findings from this review are used in the two Sections that follow
to respond to two common generalizations about the administrative
state. First, information about the frequency and content of separate statements demonstrates that commission consensus is not pervasive. Next, a description of practices and procedures governing
separate statements at the various commissions reviewed counters
the idea of independent commission homogeneity.
A. The Myth of Agency Consensus
1. Commissions Are a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’
Some of the most disruptive observations in legal and political theory identify features that are hiding in plain sight. Consider Ken
Shepsle’s famous declaration in 1992 that “Congress is a ‘they,’ not
an ‘it.’”52 Shepsle’s thesis was that, given a Congress composed of
multiple members with varying preferences, the idea of a single, coherent “legislative intent” is oxymoronic.53 Commentators committed error, therefore, in treating Congress as an undifferentiated
whole rather than as a collective of individual actors.54 Adrian
Vermeule has applied Shepsle’s insight to the courts, arguing that
theorists “overlook that the judiciary is a collective body, not a single individual.”55 He concludes that this oversight, too, has resulted
51. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 285 (offering a history of seriatim opinions in English courts).
52. Shepsle, supra note 19, at 244.
53. Id. at 239.
54. See id.
55. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 551 (2005).
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in the development of mistaken theories of statutory interpretation
or, at least, flawed justifications for those theories.56
Commissions, too, are collections of individuals. The insight that
commissions are a “they” rather than an “it” has implications for
agency accountability, which is the subject of Part II, as well as interpretive theory, which is taken up in Part III. Each of these
conclusions, however, hinges on the heterogeneity of commissioner
preference. Because agency actors tend to be more circumspect than
members of Congress about airing their disagreements in the
press, generalizations about consensus are more stubborn in the
agency context. The judicial analog may be more appropriate. We
know that judges form different opinions about the outcome of
individual cases—and that they hold different views about the
enterprise of judging more generally—because they tell us so in
concurrences and dissents.57
At some independent agencies, commissioners write separately
at a rate similar to their judicial counterparts.58 Yet because this
feature of commission decision-making has been largely overlooked,
the “consensus” assumption debunked in the legislative and judicial contexts persists with respect to administrative commissions.
This is surprising, especially considering that commissioners who
author separate statements often appear eager for attribution.59
Commissioners express separate views nearly as often as judges
do (at least on certain commissions). However, rates of dissent vary
dramatically by commission.60 Of the commissions investigated
here, the FCC produced the most separate statements,61 FERC
produced a considerable number,62 and the NRC produced almost
none.63
56. Id. at 583-84.
57. The fact that the vast majority of judicial decisions are unanimous does not alter our
views.
58. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
59. James Landis believed that localization of responsibility with individual commissioners would actually make administrative leadership roles more attractive “for men whose sole
urge for public service is the opportunity that it affords for the satisfactions of achievement.”
LANDIS, supra note 11, at 28 (explaining why the multiplication of agencies is desirable).
60. This finding is consistent with the conclusions about commission heterogeneity discussed in Part I.B.
61. See infra Part I.A.1.c.
62. See infra Part I.A.1.a.
63. See infra Part I.A.1.b. As will be discussed in more detail below, however, NRC
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Like judicial dissents, commissioner separate statements vary
not only in their frequency, but in their tone and target. Some of
these statements challenge the legal reasoning or policy underpinnings of majority opinions. Others expose procedural irregularities.
Still others allege that commission conclusions are inadequately
supported or contain factual errors. The ensuing subsections offer
an overview of separate statements at independent commissions
through accounts of the practices at FERC, the NRC, and the FCC.
a. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Congress created the Federal Power Commission in 1920 and
granted it the authority to regulate electricity in 1935.64 The Commission assumed its current name in 1977 following congressional
reorganization.65 FERC is headed by five Commissioners nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, no more than three
of whom may come from the same political party.66 The President
designates one of the Commissioners to serve as Chair.67
The Commission regulates electricity, natural gas, oil pipelines,
and hydroelectric facilities (dams).68 FERC is a busy agency, issuing
thousands of orders per year.69 Perhaps due in part to the volume of
work, the Commission’s process for issuing decisions, or “orders,” is
commissioners have the opportunity to express disagreement earlier in their decision-making
process and statements reflecting those differences in view are publicly available.
64. See History of FERC, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp [https://
perma.cc/65YR-4K9E].
65. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2012).
67. Id.
68. See What FERC Does, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp
[https://perma.cc/73ME-HKT9].
69. A 1984 General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office (GAO))
report found that, all told, “FERC produces about 85,000 decision documents [per] year.” U.S.
GEN . ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-84-8, FERC CAN IMPROVE ITS OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE BY BROADENING AND DEEPENING CURRENT MANAGEMENT EFFORTS app. I, at 2 (1984).
However, many of the decisions in relatively routine matters are delegated to staff. See id.
(“Most of FERC’s total effort goes into processing ... high-volume, relatively standardized requests.”). Such routine matters include, for example, minor change in control cases under
section 203 of the Federal Power Act. See Mergers and Sections 201 and 203 Transactions,
FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mergers.asp [https:// perma.cc/Z3VJHH2W].

2017]

ADMINISTRATIVE DISSENTS

559

highly centralized.70 At the same time, the process is relatively
informal and is governed by norms and convention rather than
published rules.71
A review of the separate statements at FERC since its inception
yielded several interesting observations.72 First, the rate of concurrence and dissent (from all decisions, not just rulemakings) was low
during the first several years of the Commission’s operation, but
rose and maintained a relatively consistent level after that. From its
creation in 1977 through 1984, the average rate of dissent was 1.44
percent. The rate then rose to a high of approximately 4 percent between 1985 and 1995, before settling back to a rate of approximately
3.25 percent from 2005 through 2014. The growth in rates of separate statements is even more pronounced when only rulemaking
issuances are examined.73 The rate of rulemaking issuances with
separate statements has grown steadily from 0.28 percent in the
period from FERC’s establishment in 1977 through 1985, to a rate
of 6.7 percent between 2005 and 2014.
Separate statements by FERC commissioners tended to be
short74 and were largely informal and collegial.75 Like courts,
commissions have their “Great Dissenter[s],”76 and FERC is no

70. See infra Part I.B.1.
71. See infra Part I.B.1.
72. Data on file with author.
73. Here, only the number of issuances with separate statements was recorded, regardless of the number of separate statements that appeared in each issuance. A separate statement was counted only once, even if more than one commissioner joined the statement.
74. The exceptions included Commissioner Kelly’s dissent from the section 216(b) rulemaking on FERC’s authority to override state decisions on siting electricity lines, and Commissioner Moeller’s dissent from Order No. 745, which set rates for demand response services
in wholesale markets. See, e.g., Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,679-82 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Order No. 745]
(Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Order No. 689, 71 Fed. Reg.
69,476 (Nov. 16, 2006) (Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50,
380). Each of these lengthier dissents disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of statutory
language. Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,679-82; Order No. 689, 71 Fed. Reg. at 69,476.
This is perhaps why the Commissioners wrote at greater length: they felt obligated to explain
their legal disagreement in full.
75. See infra Part I.B.1.
76. The phrase “Great Dissenter” has been used to refer to both Justice John Marshall
Harlan and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 601 (1994)
(arguing that Justice Harlan deserved the moniker more than Justice Holmes).
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exception.77 Commissioners demonstrating a greater propensity to
write separately included Commissioners Cheryl LaFleur (DObama), Philip Moeller (R-Obama), Suedeen Kelly (D-G.W.
Bush/Obama), Jon Wellinghoff (D-Obama), Nora Brownell (R-G.W.
Bush), William Massey (D-Clinton), Vicky Bailey (R-Clinton),
Elizabeth Moler (D-Reagan), Charles Trabandt (R-Reagan), and
Charles Stalon (D-Reagan).78
b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC is the modern incarnation of the AEC, an agency created
in the wake of World War II to promote civilian development of nuclear power and to guard against its risks.79 The Commission assumed its new name in 1975, when Congress shifted its mandate to
focus exclusively on nuclear safety.80 The NRC is composed of five
members appointed by the President “with the advice and consent
of the Senate,” one of whom the President designates as Chairman.81
No more than three of the Commission’s members may be from the
same political party.82
The Commission licenses and regulates the nation’s nuclear power
fleet and other uses of nuclear materials. Its approximately 3900
permanent employees dwarf FERC’s approximately 1450.83 Its
77. Even certain members of the FOMC, a Commission in which one would expect consensus to be paramount given its role in setting monetary policy, dissent frequently. See
Binyamin Appelbaum, The Great Dissenters, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:00 AM),
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/the-great-dissenters/ [https://perma.cc/HE5ZCTCV] (identifying three members of the FOMC that had dissented more than eight times in
a single year).
78. Commissioners issuing more than three dissenting or concurring opinions were considered to have a greater propensity to dissent than their fellow commissioners, most of whom
issued fewer than three dissenting or concurring opinions, and many of whom issued none at
all. Data on file with author.
79. See J. SAMUEL WALKER & THOMAS R. WELLOCK , A SHORT HISTORY OF NUCLEAR REG ULATION , 1946-2009, 1-2 (2010), http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1029/ML102980443.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D7DN-AYYV].
80. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); WALKER & WELLOCK , supra note 79, at 51.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
82. Id. § 5841(b)(2).
83. Compare OFFICE OF FED . OPERATIONS, EEOC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE FEDERAL WORK
FORCE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 pt. II, at 62 (2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/fsp2009/
upload/FY-2009-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWW9-YY3A] (Workforce Composition:
FERC), with id. pt. II, at 96 (Workforce Composition: NRC).
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budget is larger too: about $1 billion per year to FERC’s estimated
$320 million in 2016.84 The NRC’s internal rules and procedures are
highly formalized.85 In the opinion of one senior NRC official, this is
due, at least in part, to the Agency’s recognition of the need for
regularity and transparency when dealing with subject matter that
causes unease in the general population.
NRC Commissioners publish very few separate opinions in final
rulemaking documents. The review identified twenty-one published
separate statements from NRC rulemaking decisions.86 Two decisions contained more than one separate statement, meaning that
nineteen unique decisions contained one or more separate statements. Of the twenty-one statements, thirteen were at least partial
dissents, while the remainder were concurrences. Interestingly, formal, published separate views do not appear in rulemaking decisions after 1993. In addition, a single commissioner, James
Asselstine, was responsible for seven of the twenty-one separate
statements, including six dissents and one concurrence.87
Despite the dearth of formal separate views, dissenting views and
other comments are frequently expressed and considered by the
Commission at earlier stages of the policy making process. As described in Part I.B, commissioners may include comments on both
procedural and substantive early-stage proposals, and these comments are made public (along with the proposals themselves) on the
Commission’s website.88
84. Compare Press Release, NRC, NRC Proposes FY 2017 Budget to Congress (Feb. 9,
2016), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1604/ML16040A247.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TK-X5QM],
with FERC, FISCAL YEAR 2017 CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST, at ii (2016),
https://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/2016/FY17-Budget-Request.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2DUCSDA]. FERC offsets its entire budget through fees recovered from regulated entities. FERC,
supra; cf. Press Release, NRC, supra (observing an approximately 90 percent budget offset
from licensing fees).
85. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
86. Data on file with author.
87. Commissioner Asselstine served from May 1982 to June 1987. See James K. Asselstine,
NRC, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commission/former-commissioners/assel
stine.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PCU-SLHJ]. He began his career as an attorney with the AEC
and then the NRC and subsequently served as Associate Counsel on the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works. Id.
88. Commissioner comments on earlier-stage decision documents are also included in
published Federal Register documents such as proposed rules. However, if the commissioners
have not authored a separate concurrence to or dissent from the published rulemaking document itself, these earlier comments are included as part of the procedural history, rather than
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As an example, the Commission’s draft final rule on licensing
criteria for a proposed high-level nuclear waste disposal at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada drew separate statements from all four Commissioners sitting at that time.89 Chairman Meserve and Commissioners Dicus and Merrifield approved of the draft,90 but each noted
that, while the Commission was obligated by statute to incorporate
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards into their licensing criteria, they found those standards unnecessary to protect
public health.91 Commissioner McGaffigan went further, calling
EPA’s groundwater standard “nonsensical” because it required exposure levels below what one might receive in a brick home, in the
U.S. Capitol building, on a cross-country flight, or by eating bananas.92 Commissioner McGaffigan even expressed a hope that the
courts would strike the groundwater standard from the final rule.93
However, none of these statements were appended to the final rule
as published in the Federal Register.94
c. Federal Communications Commission
While this project did not undertake an independent review of separate statements at the FCC, some data is available from existing
studies. Daniel Ho found that the rate of dissent or concurrence,
being appended to the end of the document, or are absent from the published version. See, e.g.,
Changes, Tests, and Experiments, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,098, 56,113-15 (proposed Oct. 14, 1998) (to
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50, 52, 72) (reproducing the earlier comments of Chairman Jackson on the underlying staff issue paper approving in part and disapproving in part the staff’s
proposal for rulemaking).
89. See Voting Summary, attached to Commission Voting Record on SECY-01-0127, Draft
Final Rule: 10 CFR Part 63, “Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada” (Sept. 7, 2001) [hereinafter SECY-01-0127 DFR],
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2001/2001-0127vtr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWZ7-6ECG].
90. Id.
91. Comments of Chairman Meserve on SECY-01-0127, at 1, attached to SECY-01-0127
DFR, supra note 89; Comments of Commissioner Dicus Regarding SECY-01-0127, at 1, attached to SECY-01-0127 DFR, supra note 89; Commissioner Merrifield’s Comments on SECY01-0127, attached to SECY-01-0127 DFR, supra note 89.
92. Commisioner McGraffin’s Comments on SECY-01-0127, at 1-2, attached to SECY-010127 DFR, supra note 89.
93. Id. at 2.
94. See generally Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732 (Dec. 3, 2001) (to be codified in scattered
parts of 10 C.F.R.).
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over a commission’s lifetime, was higher at the FCC than at any of
the other independent commissions he studied.95 In another study,
Adam Candeub and Eric Hunnicut concluded that even the FCC
Chair, who by virtue of agenda-control will infrequently be in the
minority on a given issue, concurred or dissented in 119 of 9279
orders examined.96
A review of a small sample of FCC separate statements suggested
that the tone of these statements is more combative than those at
either FERC or the NRC. Consider, for example, the powerful
concurring and dissenting statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai from
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning the transition to allInternet communications technology: “The Commission would do
well to heed th[e] lesson [not to succumb to panic and hysteria] as
we move forward in this proceeding .... [I]f we don’t, it will be the
Commission that is standing in the way of progress that would
benefit the American people.”97 This more combative rhetoric, while
not atypical at the FCC, was noticeably absent from most concurrences and dissents at FERC and at the NRC.
B. The Myth of Agency Homogeneity
“Generalizations as to the organization of administrative
agencies are not only difficult but dangerous to make.” 98

95. See Ho, supra note 45, at 8 tbl.1. The other agencies Ho examined were the FTC, SEC,
FERC, FEC, Occupancy Health and Safety Review Commission (OSHRC), AEC/NRC, and
NLRB. Id. Ho’s study did not note whether or not these dissents and concurrences were accompanied by separate statements. Id. Keith Brown and Adam Candeub reviewed all FCC
votes on final orders from 1977 to 2003, a dataset comprising over 8000 orders and decisions.
Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO . MASON L.
REV. 789, 794 (2010). While they found that the vast majority of these decisions were unanimous, their denominator included many routine matters that would be unlikely to attract
commissioner attention. See id. at 793-95.
96. See Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt, Political Control of Independent Agencies:
Evidence from the FCC (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640285 [https://perma.cc/4VJR-NVKA].
97. Ensuring Customer Premises Equip. Backup Power for Continuity of Commc’ns, 29
FCC Rcd. 14,968, 15,040 (2014) (Pai, Comm’r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. CHAIRMAN OF THE S. SUBCOMM . ON ADMIN . PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG ., REP.
ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT -ELECT 19 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter
LANDIS REPORT] (work attributed to James M. Landis).
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Generalization is an academic indulgence that assists in the
(admittedly important) project of expanding conclusions across domains.99 But equally important is recognizing the fudges and glosses this move entails. Oversimplification, even when deployed as a
helpful tool, can obscure our understanding of what lies beneath.
Administrative law is guilty of such oversimplification. In one of
the foundational texts on administrative law, The Administrative
Process, James Landis notes the “range of administrative agencies”
and observes that these agencies are “characterized by an extraordinary diversity of methods and objective[s].”100 The Supreme Court
has also remarked on “[t]he incredible variety of administrative
mechanisms in this country.”101 Notwithstanding these observations,
bureaucratic diversity has yet to receive the scholarly attention it
deserves. Landis suggests why: “In a field such as this,” he proposes,
“so much rests on surmise that there is a tendency to throw the
mantle of universality about the few limited particulars that one
can discover.”102
The problem of administrative overgeneralization can only be
remedied by careful work to elucidate administrative variation.
Scholars have only recently begun to explore this variation in a serious way.103 One way to undertake this exploration is to focus on a
narrow slice of administrative practice and procedure. That is the
approach this Article takes, focusing on heterogeneity in commission approaches to separate statements.
The most obvious way that agencies differ is in their basic design.104 For much of the administrative state’s history, however, the
only distinction that received much attention was that between
single-head executive agencies, on the one hand, and multimember
independent commissions, on the other.105 Even that distinction
99. The Author is admittedly guilty of such generalization in later Parts, where broader
implications of commissioner separate statements for administrative theory and doctrine are
discussed.
100. LANDIS, supra note 11, at 22.
101. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 51-52 (1975) (examining the extent of the right
to an impartial decision maker in administrative adjudication); see also Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 520-21 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(observing that administrative “statutes create a host of different organizational structures”).
102. LANDIS, supra note 11, at 113.
103. See sources cited supra note 5.
104. See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 18 (2003).
105. There is no unanimity on the features that make an agency “independent” as opposed
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glosses over variations within the category of independent agencies.106 And some agencies also seem to fall across or beyond these
categories. Indeed, Anne Joseph O’Connell argues that these
“boundary” institutions are far more central to the bureaucracy than
previously acknowledged.107
Design distinctions are important. But separate statements, and
the process by which they are issued, spotlight another less
conspicuous aspect of commission diversity: procedural diversity.
Agencies that share major design features, such as political insulation and a multimember commission structure, may be strikingly
different in terms of their actual operation.108 Such procedural
diversity often escapes judicial notice, since agencies have broad
discretion to innovate above the procedural minima set by the
Constitution, statutes, and executive orders.109 Part I.B.1 demonstrates procedural diversity at FERC, the NRC, and the FCC in the
context of decision-making and the authoring of separate statements.
to “executive.” See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND . L. REV. 599, 603 (2010) (arguing that the varying degrees of independence across agencies “challenge standard accounts of the line dividing independent and
executive-branch agencies”). However, few dispute that such a conceptual distinction exists
or that, in most cases, it is possible to distinguish between the two in practice. Kirti Datla and
Richard Revesz have chronicled some of the features that differentiate independent commissions from one another, with an eye to the impact each of these features has on an agency’s
relative independence from the political branches. Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 772.
106. See PHH Corp v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 17-21 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted Feb. 16, 2017 (discussing several examples of single-headed, independent agencies).
107. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 85152 (2014) (identifying agencies that do not easily fit the definitions of “executive agency” or
“independent commission”); see also Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy
Federalism, 72 MD . L. REV. 773, 777-79 (2013) (characterizing the U.S. energy system under
a holistic interaction-based model); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy
Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (exploring “hybrid” agencies that span the publicprivate and state-federal boundaries).
108. Even a standard activity such as cost-benefit analysis or making documents available
for inspection can vary across commissions. See Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 460 & n.48 (2014)
(discussing variations across commissions); Stephen F. Williams, The Era of “Risk-Risk” and
the Problem of Keeping the APA up to Date, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1385-86 (1996) (contrasting implementation at the Social Security Administration (SSA) and FERC of the APA requirement that documents be “available for public inspection” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)
(1994))).
109. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s White
Space, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 523 (2017).
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Independent commissions also differ significantly in the degree to
which politics affects their decision-making. This was evident after
analyzing patterns of separate statement writing at FERC, which
displayed none of the stark politicization that has been noted at the
FCC. Part I.B.2 sets out this finding in more detail.
1. Process
Each of the agencies examined demonstrated a different level of
procedural formality when it came to the rules governing opinion
writing and, by extension, separate statements. For example, commissions differ in terms of whether—and how—commissioners are
given an opportunity to respond to the separate views of other commissioners. The degree of procedural transparency, too, varies by
commission.
FERC fell at the least formal end of the spectrum, with a process
dictated almost entirely by norm and convention.110 No written rules
or policies, either internal or external, appear to govern Commission
rulemaking decisions. At FERC, early written views are not circulated. Instead, Commissioners may express disagreement with a
decision draft’s approach and/or indicate their intention to write
separately at early-stage staff meetings.111 Compromises to secure
commissioner agreement can be made as late as the morning of a
vote. During public meetings when the Commissioners come together to vote on their orders, each Commissioner typically offers
remarks contextualizing their vote (although this is not required).
After the vote, there is typically a delay in issuing the final order
(which may not be ready immediately in any case) to allow Commis110. Because FERC’s procedures have not been documented in rules or manuals of any
kind, this Subsection is based on background conversations with current and former Commissioners and agency staff. Exceptions are noted.
111. The Sunshine Act precludes private meetings involving more than two commissioners. See Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)-(b) (2012). The Act requires that
any substantive meetings involving “at least the number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency” be public. Id. § 552b(a)-(d). At FERC, a quorum
consists of three commissioners, 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2012), and therefore only two commissioners
may meet privately at a time. One former Commissioner noted that he did not believe the
Sunshine Act to be a serious limitation on intra-agency communications since it did not
impede staff meetings and did not prevent bilateral conversations among commissioners.
However, other current and former officials identified it as a considerable constraint on
dialogue and compromise among commissioners.
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sioners time to append their separate statements to the order.112
Separate statements are appended to Commission decision documents and are available on the Commission’s website, in the
Federal Register, and through subscription services such as Westlaw
and Lexis.113 These statements appear at the end of the decision
document immediately prior to the endnotes.114
The NRC’s internal decision-making procedures and norms are
markedly different from FERC’s. The Commission adopts and
makes available Internal Commission Procedures that cover the
Commission decision-making process in considerable detail and
include the process for issuing separate statements.115
Decision-making at the NRC (including rulemaking) may be initiated by the Chair, by the Commission as a whole, or by senior
staff.116 Because, as at FERC, NRC Commissioners may not meet
privately in groups larger than two,117 they often communicate in
written form. Decisions may be initiated by the circulation of staff
issue papers (SECY papers), memoranda from individual commissioners recommending a course of action (COMs), or responses to
memoranda from staff containing recommendations or seeking Commission guidance (COMSECYs).118
The results of any votes taken in written form are recorded in a
“Staff Requirements Memorandum” (SRM),119 which reflects the
position taken by a majority of NRC Commissioners.120 Any sub112. However, separate statements may be issued later if necessary. Commissioners typically use their own staffs to help with drafting those statements. See also LANDIS REPORT,
supra note 98, at 19.
113. See Decisions & Notices, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/dec-not.asp [https://
perma.cc/JH2K-DWTK].
114. See, e.g., Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,177, 11,186-87 (proposed Feb. 17, 2011) (Spitzer, Comm’r, dissenting)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
115. See generally NRC, INTERNAL COMMISSION PROCEDURES (2016) [hereinafter NRC
PROCEDURES]. These rules prescribe each step of the process down to the colored bands at the
top of each internal circulation as well as the procedures for altering those colors. Id. ch. II,
at 2.
116. See id. ch. II, at 1.
117. See supra note 111.
118. See NRC PROCEDURES, supra note 115, ch. II, at 1. A response to COMSECYs is relatively informal and typically occurs via an electronic response sheet circulated along with the
SECY. Id. ch. II, at 6.
119. Id. ch. III, at 1.
120. Id. ch. III, at 3.
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sequent substantive revisions of the SRM are circulated to the full
Commission for a two-day review period, and any comments
generated during this process are themselves circulated to each
Commissioner.121 A final SRM is then generated based on the views
of a majority of the Commission.122 Separate views are included in
the Commission Voting Record (CVR), which is made public on the
Commission’s website.123
NRC Commissioners thus have several opportunities to note disagreements on the record prior to the culmination of the internal
decision-making process. Commissioners may also have their separate views appended to Federal Register notices, so long as this
intention is expressed in the NRC Commissioner’s response to the
draft SRM.124 This earlier circulation allows Commissioners the
opportunity to consider each other’s positions,125 and each Commissioner may submit responses for inclusion in the Federal Register.126
In the final document, separate statements, called “separate
views,” typically appear in the middle of published decisions, right
before various regulatory compliance statements.127 For this reason,
they are somewhat difficult to locate unless a reader knows what to
look for or is perusing the decision document in its entirety.
The FCC’s processes fall somewhere between FERC’s and the
NRC’s in terms of formality and detail.128 While internal guidelines exist, these guidelines are not binding nor are they publicly
available. At the FCC, some votes are cast electronically, others at
public meetings. In each case, forms are circulated with boxes to be
121. Id.
122. Id. ch. III, at 5.
123. Id. ch. III, at 12. Individual commissioners may make their own vote, as well as any
comments, public even before the SRM and CVR are made public. See id. ch. III, at 5.
However, the rules state that a “Commissioner should inform ... his or her fellow Commissioners promptly” if he or she elects this option. Id.
124. The requirement that any separate statement be included in the response to the draft
SRM is designed to ensure that the other Commissioners are afforded the opportunity to consider the separate views. See id. ch. III, at 6.
125. See id. ch. III, at 4, 6.
126. Id. ch. III, at 6.
127. See, e.g., Changes, Tests, and Experiments, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,098, 56,115 (proposed Oct.
14, 1998) (Diaz, Comm’r, commenting on SECY-98-171) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 50, 52,
72).
128. As with FERC, because the FCC’s processes have not been documented in rules or
manuals, this Subsection relies on background conversations with current and former Commissioners and agency staff.
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checked if the Commissioner intends to author a separate statement. At public meetings, each Commissioner will typically make
an oral statement regarding the matter to be voted upon. One FCC
insider noted that these meetings have become less deliberative
and more performative over time. If an FCC Commissioner is not
going to approve of a decision across the board, a separate statement is expected. These separate statements are circulated by email to the Commission once voting is complete. Any ensuing edits
to statements are themselves circulated in an iterative process to
ensure that other Commissioners have an opportunity to respond.
The FCC process is not without its critics. According to one Commission insider, while changes to Commission decisions are circulated prior to a vote, the source of those changes is not necessarily
identified. Furthermore, when Commissioners propose changes to
the text, there is no obligation for other Commissioners to respond.129
2. Partisanship
Commissions are also heterogeneous when it comes to politicization. The original understanding of agencies in general
and independent commissions in particular was that they were to
lie “outside the proper sphere of politics.”130 Instead, they were
designed to be impartial bodies of experts.131 Nevertheless, more
129. Thus, while majority Commissioner changes are typically incorporated into the final
document, this is not true of minority Commissioner suggestions. A Commission insider noted
that this is perhaps due to the assumption that minority Commissioners will be unwilling to
vote for the decision in any case, and thus are likely to write separately. If true, however, this
feature of the process robs separate statements of many of their benefits in terms of improving decision-making substance. See infra Part IV.
130. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 56 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 494 (1941)
(emphasis omitted); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935)
(explaining that independent commissions were intended “to be non-partisan” and “to exercise
the trained judgment of a body of experts ‘appointed by law and informed by experience’” (first
citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907); and then
citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1931)); PHH Corp. v. CFPB,
839 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that the early independent commissions “were designed
as non-partisan expert bodies that would neutrally and impartially issue rules, bring law
enforcement actions, and resolve disputes in their respective jurisdictions”).
131. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 36 (“The Progressives had an abiding faith in ... the
capacity of American government to make rational decisions provided experts in the administrative agencies could remain free from partisan political considerations.”); see also
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than half of the existing independent commissions have partisan
balance requirements,132 indicating that potential partisanship, at
least, was of concern to the Congresses that created them.133 And
there is little doubt that Presidents seek to appoint commissioners
whose views align with their own,134 primarily to exercise control,135
but also, perhaps, to return favors to political patrons.136
But does this mean that the commissioners themselves, once appointed, behave as partisan actors?137 Commissioner separate
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624 (upholding removal restrictions for independent commissioners, in part, because “the commission is to be nonpartisan; and it must, from the very
nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality”).
132. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 797 tbl.4 (identifying partisan balance requirements at the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), FERC, Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), FTC, Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Mediation Board
(NMB), NRC, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Postal Regulatory Commission
(PRC), Surface Transportation Board (STB), United States Postal Service (USPS), and the
Commission on Civil Rights, among others).
Partisanship requirements are typically justified as a restraint on presidential influence.
See, e.g., id. at 798. The requirements may also avoid ideological excess. Cf. Emerson H. Tiller
& Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM . L. REV. 215,
216 (1999) (proposing that no more than two judges on any three-judge federal appeals court
panel be from the same political party).
133. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 26 (“[T]he requirement of bipartisan membership
was regarded as an important guarantor of impartiality.”); see also id.at 25 (noting that one
concern in establishing the ICC was that “the bipartisan requirement would impose political
bias upon the commission”). But see Glen O. Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947, 963 (1971) (“It is not bipartisanship as such that is
important; it is rather the safeguards and balanced viewpoint that can be provided by plural
membership.”).
134. See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 27-28 (2008);
Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM . J. POL. SCI.
197, 200 (1982) (elaborating upon the relationship between presidential administration and
commission decision-making); cf. Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Control of Independent
Regulatory Commissions Through Appointment: The Case of the ICC, 17 ADMIN . & SOC’Y 61,
69 (1985) (concluding, based on a study of ICC decisions over twenty years, that presidential
influence through appointment is illusory and merely represents the shared attitudes of
commissioners and the President).
135. See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 235, 237-39 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Paterson eds., 1985) (arguing that because
Presidents tend to be held accountable for the functioning of the bureaucracy, they assert
control, in part, by politicizing the bureaucracy).
136. David E. Lewis, Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and
Agency Competence, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD . Q. 60, 63-67 (2009).
137. Several studies suggest that they do. See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 459, 460-61 (2008) (citing increasing party polarization in general as an explanation for
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statements shed light on whether politics plays a significant role in
commission decision-making.138 While the data on separate statements provide no basis for disputing the phenomenon of partisan
appointments, they do suggest that not every independent commission has experienced an increase in partisan decision-making.
Studies that claim to have found partisanship in independent commission voting patterns have focused their attention on a single
agency: the FCC.139 These findings are consistent with the experience of Commission insiders. One insider noted, for example, that
during their tenure at the Agency, there was no perceived downside
for minority commissioners to dissent, while majority commission-

increasing polarization on independent commissions); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman,
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 801, 801-02, 80506 (1991) (finding evidence of successful political control at seven regulatory commissions
(both executive and independent) by reviewing enforcement activity over time). From a review
of more than forty years of FCC decisions, Daniel Ho finds that commission partisanship may
affect policy—perhaps substantially. See Ho, supra note 45, at 3-4 (reviewing dataset of
published adjudications and rulemakings from the FCC from 1965-2006).
If commissions have become more partisan over time, one explanation may be that members of Congress have increasingly delayed commissioner nominations, forcing Presidents to
submit compromise “slates” of candidates consisting of majority-party commissioners as well
as minority-party commissioners “committed to the agenda of the opposition party.” Devins
& Lewis, supra, at 460-61. This phenomenon has also been referred to as “batching.” See id.
at 489; Ho, supra note 45, at 3-4 (identifying a pronounced increase in the number of
“batched” appointments).
138. Examination of commissioner-voting records cannot provide a definitive answer to
questions about politicization, since, among other problems, disentangling partisanship from
ideology is exceptionally difficult. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with
Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 817 (2010).
Nevertheless, even the identification of correlations (and especially their absence) can produce
some insights. See id. at 816 & n.9. And because commissioner separate statements, like their
judicial counterparts, tend to be less guarded in tone and expression than majority opinions,
they offer more insight into the policy priorities of individual commissioners. See, e.g., infra
notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
139. Daniel Ho’s study of voting behavior at the FCC from 1965-2006, for example, found
a strong correlation between party affiliation and the voting behaviors of forty-six different
FCC commissioners, even when the party of the appointing President was held constant. Ho,
supra note 45, at 26 fig.7, 35; see also Brown & Candeub, supra note 95, at 809 (contending
that independent agencies prioritize congressional concerns over presidential interests);
Brown & Candeub, supra note 45, at 22 tbl.2 (finding that FCC commissioners of the same
party as the Chair tend to vote with the Chair more frequently than do other commissioners);
Candeub & Hunnicutt, supra note 96, at 9-10 (finding increased party-line voting on the FCC
during periods of divided government).
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ers were more reticent to express disagreement with their party’s
chair.140
At the FCC, therefore, party may be a strong predictor of voting
behavior.141 On other commissions, however, political party appears
to be a less salient factor in commission decision-making.142 A breakdown of FERC separate statements by commissioner party offered
support for what many commission insiders have claimed all along:
that pure partisanship does not play a significant role in FERC’s
decision-making.143 Votes on this Commission simply do not split
cleanly along party lines.144
This observation is true notwithstanding the fact that FERC’s
work has become increasingly politicized as environmental outcomes have become more closely identified with energy decisionmaking. This focus on environmental impacts pits (typically leftleaning) environmental advocates against the (typically rightleaning) fossil fuel industry.145 Recently, the Commission’s headquarters at 888 First St., N.E. in Washington, D.C., was a target
for protesters concerned about the approval of pipeline infrastructure that could facilitate natural gas development.146 Nevertheless,
the data on separate statements does not reflect increased partisanship in FERC rulemaking.

140. See supra note 129.
141. See Ho, supra note 45, at 3-4 (“[T]he effect of commissioner ideology on voting is profound.”).
142. See id. at 7-11.
143. Former FERC Commissioner Marc Spitzer has publicly opined that 99.9 percent of
Commission business is neither particularly controversial nor particularly partisan. Monica
Trauzzi, Former Commissioner Spitzer Discusses Politics of Senate Confirmations, Impact on
Commission, E&E NEWS: ON POINT (July 17, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/
1060003079 [https://perma.cc/6V3C-YZRA].
144. See id. (“[T]he FERC has done a very good job paying attention to th[e] issues and not
allowing the political noise to somehow disconcert them or make them less effective.”).
145. This is an oversimplification. Nevertheless, one might expect to see at least a softer
version of political influence on commissioner behavior in increasingly partisan times. See
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 8-9 (2009) (distinguishing between legitimate political influences and “raw
politics or partisan politics,” and arguing that the former, but not the latter, can legitimately
inform agency decision-making).
146. In May 2016, FERC took the unprecedented step of closing its monthly meeting to the
public, citing safety concerns. Michael Brooks, Pipeline Protesters Force FERC to Close
Monthly Meeting, RTO INSIDER (May 19, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/ferc-closed-openmeeting-26581/ [https://perma.cc/HZY3-SEAS].
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The NRC provides another useful counterpoint to suggestions of
independent commission partisanship. At the NRC, separate statements from final decisions are rare.147 On its own, this fact suggests
a marked absence of partisanship on the Commission. Nevertheless,
allegations of Commission partisanship have been rampant in
recent years, especially after the appointment of Gregory Jaczko as
Chairman in 2009.148 These allegations stem largely from the Commission’s role in studying Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a possible
permanent repository for nuclear waste.149 Some saw the appointment of Jaczko, a former staffer for project opponent Senator Harry
Reid (D-Nev.), as a blatantly political move.150 But allegations of
commission partisanship may have been overblown. The debate over
whether Yucca Mountain should be used as a long-term repository
for nuclear waste may indeed have divided the Commission, but it
is not clear that the divisions were along political lines. Indeed,
reports suggest that some of the strongest support for continuing
work on the Yucca Mountain project came from Commissioner
William Magwood, a Democrat like Chairman Jaczko.151
There are good reasons to desire diversity, broadly defined, on
independent commissions. If the lessons about agency heterogeneity
in this Section have taught us anything, however, it is that diversity
means different things on different commissions. There is no good
reason, therefore, to think that partisanship is a good proxy for diversity in all cases.152
Even at agencies such as FERC, where the data on separate statements suggest that partisanship does not drive decision-making,
those statements can still provide useful information about what
147. See Ho, supra note 45, at 8 tbl.1 (demonstrating a lesser rate of concurrences and
dissents in the NRC relative to other independent federal agencies).
148. See H.R. COMM . ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM , 112TH CONG., A CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP : HOW THE ACTIONS OF CHAIRMAN GREGORY JACZKO ARE DAMAGING THE NUCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION 14-16 (2011), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/1213-11-NRC-Report-Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9XA-NZY3].
149. See generally id. at 15-20.
150. Id. at 16.
151. Id. at 17-20.
152. For a judicial analog, consider the recent comments of Justice Sonia Sotomayor that
the Supreme Court is insufficiently diverse when it comes to educational background, religion,
and geographic origin. Adam Liptak, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan Muse over a CookieCutter Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES: SIDEBAR (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/06/us/politics/sotomayor-kagan-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/H9CH-F8GD].
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other factors may account for voting patterns. Indeed, the substance
of separate statements suggests that policy differences that align
less closely with political party have driven—and continue to
drive—disagreements at FERC. While more research is needed to
determine which divisions are most salient, the content of commissioner separate statements suggests that three policy dyads explain
dissenting behavior at FERC. First is what may be broadly described as the centralization/regionalization dyad. In a separate dissent from Commission rules setting nationwide policy for wholesale
markets, for example, Commissioner James Moeller expressed
support for allowing regional wholesale markets to set their own
prices and rules rather than having them imposed by FERC.153
Second is the state/federal authority dyad. The Federal Power Act
divides authority over electricity and natural gas between state
public utility commissions and FERC.154 Decisions made at the
federal level, even those that do not infringe on state legal rights,
may still impose policy restrictions on state governments. Some
Commissioners appear to be more concerned about this than others.
For example, Commissioner Linda Breathitt, a former chair of the
Kentucky Public Service Commission (and who again served on that
Commission after leaving FERC), issued a separate statement from
a Commission order initiating a consultation process with the states
on the establishment of Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs).155 Commissioner Breathitt applauded the initiation of the
consultation process, but expressed concern that state officials were
not being asked to weigh in on some of the more fundamental questions of RTO design.156
Finally, greater sympathy with either energy producers or energy
consumers may drive voting behavior on the Commission. Commis153. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,972-74 (Oct. 11, 2011) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting
in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur also spoke out in
favor of regional flexibility. See, e.g., Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,890, 64,903-04 (Nov. 23, 2012)
(LaFleur, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Integration of
Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,546 (Sept. 11, 2012) (LaFleur, Comm’r,
dissenting in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
154. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
155. See Section 202(a) Notice for Regional Transmission Organizations, 63 Fed. Reg.
66,158 (Nov. 24, 1998).
156. Id. at 66,164-65 (Breathitt, Comm’r, concurring).
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sioner John Norris, a former Iowa Utilities Board Commissioner
and former Chief of Staff to Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack,157 demonstrated his propensity for consumer protection when he dissented
from an order on mandatory reliability standards because the Commission’s process had failed to give sufficient weight to the costs
such standards impose on consumers.158
While it remains to be determined precisely how each of the
above dyads drives FERC decision-making, what is clear is that
each can account for dissenting behavior in a way that partisanship alone cannot. This finding has implications for agency design.
Most independent commission organic statutes require that no
more than a simple majority of commissioners come from the same
political party, but other types of diversity are not typically required.159 Especially on commissions where partisanship is not
driving decision-making, policymakers would do well to consider
whether requiring other types of diversity on commissions may
better ensure balanced decision-making.
II. DISSENT’S ROLE IN FACILITATING POLITICAL OVERSIGHT
The last Part’s goal was largely descriptive, setting out findings
from a review of separate statements and the process by which they
are generated at FERC, the NRC, and the FCC. This Part turns to
implications of that research for some of the foundational questions
in administrative law. We begin with the question of external oversight. Separate statements can ameliorate, at least partially, some
of the problems endemic in external monitoring of the bureaucracy.
157. U.S. FERC Commissioner Jim Norris to Leave Energy Regulator, REUTERS (Aug. 7,
2014, 6:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ferc-norris-idUSKBN0G72H020140807
[https://perma.cc/96HQ-S4MG]; see Hannah Northey, Once Indispensable to Powerful Pols,
FERC Commissioner Navigates Power Politics, E&ENEWS: GREENWIRE (Apr. 15, 2013), https://
www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059979485 [https://perma.cc/SPL4-38J3] (noting Norris
“served as chairman of the Iowa Utilities Board”).
158. Transmission Planning Reliability Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,686, 26,696-97 (Apr. 19,
2012) (Norris, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 40).
159. For a list of commissions with partisan balance requirements, see Datla & Revesz,
supra note 21, at 797 tbl.4. A few commissions do have additional commissioner requirements.
For example, the Federal Reserve Board must be appointed with “due regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical
divisions of the country.” 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012).
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Independent commissions in particular have been at the center of
a literature that alternately questions and condones the insulation
of regulatory policy making from political control.160 But few would
argue that independent commissions should be immune even from
monitoring by Congress and the President.161 Making agencies accountable to their political overseers, and by extension to the public,
requires that there be some reliable mechanism for observing agency decisions and behavior. By making commission decision-making
more transparent and revealing the preferences of individual commissioners in a way that unsigned majority documents do not, separate statements can facilitate oversight of commission actions more
generally and of individual commissioner behavior.162

160. For articles more sympathetic to agency insulation, see, for example, Barkow, supra
note 21, at 17-18 (proposing design elements that can make an agency more independent from
political pressure); and Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1825-27 (2010) (arguing for
greater agency independence that permits broad responsiveness to the public but insulates
agencies from populist shocks). The critique of agency insulation from politics has mostly
focused on independent agencies’ potentially greater susceptibility to interest-group capture.
See, e.g., BERNSTEIN , supra note 11, at 128-30; see also Rodriguez, supra, at 1824-25 (arguing
that the issue is not so much one of insulation from politics as a choice between political
overseers).
161. Those who find independent agencies both constitutional and desirable typically agree
that some democratic checks are warranted. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON . & ORG . 243, 245 (1987).
By enhancing those checks, separate statements thereby enhance the legitimacy of independent commissions. For those more skeptical about the administrative state’s inherent
legitimacy, improving oversight can still help to mitigate concerns about administrative absolutism.
162. Here, I put to one side some of the problems with overaccountability identified by
Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 26, at 188, except to note that commissioner separate statements may mitigate some of the pathologies they identify in that they may help political principals accurately identify commissioners as either public-spirited or captured. See id. at 19091. In fact, separate statements might aid in what Jacob Gersen and Matthew Stephenson
call the “third-party oversight” solution, in which a secondary agent polices the behavior of
a first agent. See id. at 213. Gersen has elsewhere suggested that a situation in which agents
compete may ameliorate the principal-agent problem. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212-13.
Intracommission checking may function in a similar way to interagency checking, with
Congress able to incentivize faithful behavior by playing commissioners against one another.
See id.
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A. Congressional Oversight
Positive political theorists define the central dilemma in legislative delegations to administrative agencies as a principal-agent
problem.163 Congress delegates tasks to these commissions via legislation. So far so good. But how can Congress ensure that commissions remain faithful to its wishes?164 Mechanisms of congressional
control are many and varied.165 They include Senate confirmation of
the President’s nominees, control over the agency’s statutory mandate, oversight and the committee system, the appropriations process, and less formal contacts through congressional liaisons.166
The effectiveness of most, if not all, of these tools depends on
access to good information about agency behavior, and Congress has
limited resources available to monitor agency implementation of its
directives.167 Separate opinions ameliorate the principal-agent problem by reducing Congress’s informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the
agency.168 They provide a valuable source of information about the
priorities and preferences of individual commissioners. They may
report on “unfaithful” behavior by other agency actors (typically
other commissioners). Commissioners may even use their separate
163. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 162, at 211-16 (analyzing jurisdictional assignment as a
tool for managing the principal-agent problem); Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 26, at 18587 (noting the pervasiveness of the principal-agent problem); Matthew D. McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1989); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency
Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review
of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1381, 1388-89 (2011) (proposing a standard
for review of agency delay that focuses on the initial delegation to the agency).
164. See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 1-3 (1964)
(defining “legislative control” as a determination of “whether legislative policies are being
faithfully, effectively, and economically carried out”).
165. For an overview of congressional oversight of the bureaucracy, see MASHAW ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 174-192.
166. See, e.g., JOEL D. ABERBACH , KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990). Others have suggested constituency service as a technique of oversight, in that it often entails direct contact between congressional staff and an agency on
behalf of a constituent. See, e.g., John R. Johannes, Casework as a Technique of U.S. Congressional Oversight of the Executive, 4 LEGIS. STUD . Q. 325, 325-26 (1979). This direct contact
provides an opportunity to observe agency operations on the ground, and to collect information about what is working and what is not. See id.
167. McCubbins et al., supra note 161, at 243.
168. See id. at 247 (“The crime of runaway bureauracy requires opportunity as well as
motive, and this is supplied by asymmetric information.”).
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statements to communicate directly with Congress.169 Each of these
points will be explored in turn.
First, separate opinions offer specific information about individual
commissioners and their policy priorities. It is often difficult (if not
impossible) to derive this information from unsigned majority
opinions issued by a commission, as those decisions reflect collective, rather than individual, commissioner views.170 Separate statements, on the other hand, are signed, and thus their sentiments
may be directly attributed to their authors. In addition, as in the
judicial context, those sentiments are often less guardedly expressed. Consider FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson’s full-throated
dissent from an FCC opinion rejecting a media group’s challenge to
the Commission’s comparative licensing process.171 In that dissent,
Commissioner Robinson characterized the process as “the FCC’s
equivalent of the Medieval trial by ordeal.”172
Second, commissioners writing separately sometimes accuse their
fellow commissioners of actions or understandings that are inconsistent with congressional preferences. For example, in one dissent,
FERC Commissioner Suedeen Kelly labeled the Commission’s decision to review contract modifications under a permissive “public
interest” standard as “an abdication of the statutory authority and
obligations entrusted to the Commission by Congress ... contrary to
the will of Congress.”173 These accounts might allow Congress to
distinguish between undesirable (from their perspective) policy outcomes that are the result of external factors and those that are the
result of commission error or commissioner activism. That information might, in turn, facilitate the investigation or even sanction of
individual commissioners.
In addition, commissioners may point Congress to procedural irregularities in commission decision-making. Consider Commissioner
Marc Spitzer’s dissent from a FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
169. One source confirmed that commissioners do indeed intend to speak directly to Congress in some separate statements.
170. Cf. Henderson, supra note 32, at 313-15 (describing the compromise necessary after
John Marshall replaced the Supreme Court’s seriatim practice for a single-voiced Court).
171. See Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 371, 421-23 (1976).
172. Id. at 443 (Robinson, Comm’r, dissenting).
173. Standard of Review for Modifications to Jurisdictional Agreements, 71 Fed. Reg. 303,
306 (proposed Dec. 27, 2005) (Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35,
370).

2017]

ADMINISTRATIVE DISSENTS

579

on compensation for frequency regulation in wholesale power markets, in which he expressed concern about the limited input from
“traditional” frequency resources such as pumped-hydro storage
facilities.174 Or consider a critique from FERC Commissioner Philip
Moeller, dissenting from an Order Denying Rehearing from a
Commission decision updating its charges for the use of government
land by hydroelectric projects, in which he criticized the Commission’s failure to seek public input on fee assessment, a failure he
claimed “reduces confidence in the fairness of government process.”175
Whether they provide information about commissioner preferences more generally or identify potential violations of legislative
priorities, separate statements can serve as “fire-alarms,” alerting
legislators to shirking or bureaucratic drift.176 While McCubbins
and Schwartz anticipated that alarms would be raised by individuals or interest groups, commissioner separate statements can
also serve as either intentional or unintentional alerts to members
of Congress.
Even if members of Congress are not monitoring commission
issuances for the presence of dissent, commissioner separate statements show up in news feeds and thus may be easily captured by
congressional staff.177 Consider the following headlines from the last
few years:

174. Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 76
Fed. Reg. 11,177, 11,186-87 (proposed Feb. 17, 2011) (Spitzer, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
175. Separate Statement of Comm’r Moeller, dissenting, at 2, attached to Order Denying
Rehearing, 129 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2009).
176. Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz proposed that Congress oversees administrative policy by relying on “fire-alarms,” or reports of administrative misdeeds by individuals and interest groups, rather than by sampling administrative behavior on an ongoing
basis to discover violations of legislative goals. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM . J. POL. SCI.
165, 166 (1984); see also Barkow, supra note 21, at 41 (concluding that commissioner dissents
can “serve[ ] as a ‘fire alarm’ that alerts Congress and the public at large that the agency’s decision might merit closer scrutiny”).
177. Joel Aberbach found that staff monitor the bureaucracy, in part, via news publications, including specialized media known as trade press. ABERBACH , supra note 166, at 87
(reporting survey results).
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" Commissioner Moeller Dissents from FERC Decision Granting
Waiver of ISO-NE Auction Rules 178
" Republican FCC Commissioners Dissent Over Simple Mechanism in CVAA Rule 179
" SEC Commissioner’s Dissent May Signal Harsher Sanctions
Against Accountants 180

Each of these headlines could show up in the trade press monitored by members of Congress and their staffs, especially if a member were particularly interested in that issue area at the time.181
Separate statements may be most effective as “fire alarms” when
they are limited in their frequency. If they occur too regularly, they
may become mere background noise. To provide effective signaling,
therefore, separate statements must be rare enough that the other
branches will take note when they occur.182 Members of Congress do
take note of commissioner separate statements. Recently, in her
attack on a rule on bank collateral, Senator Elizabeth Warren (DMass.) cited Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Commissioner Sharon Bowen’s dissent with approval.183 Similarly,
in 2011, Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.) drew on a dissent by FCC

178. Marcy Crane, SNL ENERGY POWER DAILY, Sept. 4, 2015.
179. WASH . INTERNET DAILY, May 22, 2015.
180. Stephen G. Stroup, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
sec-commissioner-s-dissent-may-signal-harsher-sanctions-against-accountants
[https://perma.cc/ 6JM7-FA37].
181. Often, congressional staff facilitate oversight. See ABERBACH , supra note 166, at 80
(noting that, for committees at least, “professional staff are [the] eyes and ears ... in ...
relations with the bureaucracy”). Regardless of which individuals actually conduct oversight,
however, commissioner separate statements provide a lower-cost monitoring target. There is
no reason to think that the information contained in those statements provides a less accurate
representation of commissioner views than those obtained, for example, via informal contacts
which Aberbach acknowledges offer “an incomplete view of the executive world, one most
favorable to [the contact’s] particular interests.” Id. at 86.
182. By contrast, if separate statements are used to support “police patrols”—more centralized, systematic monitoring of agencies by Congress—frequency is a virtue. See McCubbins
& Schwartz, supra note 176, at 166. Some have questioned McCubbins and Schwartz’s contention that Congress relies to a greater extent on fire alarms than police patrols. See ABERBACH,
supra note 166, at 98-99 (concluding, based on a survey of congressional staffers, “the policepatrol approach is prominent”).
183. 162 CONG. REC. S2533 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2016) (statement of Sen. Warren).
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Commissioner Robert McDowell in arguing that no new government
regulations on net neutrality were needed to protect consumers.184
Members of Congress may take special note when concurring or
dissenting commissioners speak directly to them. In September
2008, the CFTC issued a Staff Report with recommendations for the
regulation of “swap dealers” (market-makers in over-the-counter
swap transactions).185 Commissioner Bart Chilton dissented from
the report.186 While expressing appreciation for the work of Commission staff, Commissioner Chilton stated that he “d[id] not believe
the Commission’s recommendations go far enough,” critiqued some
of the underlying data on which the recommendations were based,
and urged the Commission to “request that Congress provide specific statutory authorities” to allow the Commission to address the
problem.187 In introducing legislation to amend the Act several
weeks later, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) noted that the bill was
“consistent with CFTC Commissioner Chilton’s dissenting views”
and “provide[d] the CFTC with the statutory authorities requested
by Commissioner Chilton.”188
These direct, public requests embodied in published concurrences
or dissents may carry more weight with reputation-conscious legislators than do private, informal conversations. Indeed, there is
evidence to suggest that agenda setting in congressional oversight
is driven in no small part by the desire of legislators to avoid scandal, crises, and the like.189
One final point is worthy of mention. Congress can also manipulate agency structure and design in order to safeguard original political understandings from future upset.190 But Congress has not
184. 157 CONG. REC. 17,017 (2011) (statement of Sen. Ayotte).
185. CFTC, STAFF REPORT ON COMMODITY SWAP DEALERS & INDEX TRADERS WITH
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRC5-JBKT].
186. Id. at 60-62.
187. Id. at 60-61.
188. 154 CONG . REC., 21,715 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Levin). Although
the bill never made it out of committee, the Dodd-Frank Act later provided the CFTC and the
SEC with authority to regulate over-the-counter swaps. 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012).
189. ABERBACH , supra note 166, at 120-21.
190. Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON . & ORG . 93, 93-94, 99-100 (1992); McCubbins et al., supra note 161, at
256-59, 261-63; Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1440-46 (2011); see also McCubbins et al., supra note 163, at 432-33.
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attempted to manipulate the availability or frequency of separate
statements in this way. Agency-authorizing statutes make no mention of separate statements or the procedures governing them.191
Rather, the practice of separate statements evolved organically
within agencies, likely as an import from the judicial process. To
date, therefore, the assistance these statements provide in facilitating oversight is, from the perspective of Congress, mere fortuity.
B. Presidential Oversight
For all of the reasons detailed in the previous Section, separate
statements can be a boon to congressional committees and individual members seeking to assess the extent to which independent
commissions may be acting as unfaithful agents. But separate statements are not a tool of congressional oversight alone. They can also
facilitate presidential oversight.192 Separate statements can improve
oversight by translating complex commission decisions into plain
English, by highlighting potentially problematic decisions, or by
revealing individual commissioner preferences
Of course, in contrast to executive agencies, so-called independent
commissions are designed to be insulated from the President.193 The
President can only remove commissioners for cause,194 and independent commissions need not submit either their rules or their budgets for OMB review.195 These commissions also have independent
litigating authority.196 And yet, the President is not wholly without
191. Of particular relevance to this Article, neither the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-825r (2012), nor the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-4 (2012), contain
directions for how to handle separate statements. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 is
similarly devoid of language on separate statements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2012).
192. The literature on presidential control has also been attuned to the problem of
bureaucratic slippage. LEWIS, supra note 104, at 4-11.
193. Indeed, David Lewis has found an association between the creation of more insulated
agencies and periods of divided government characterized by strong congressional majorities.
Id. at 60; see also Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN ? 267, 275 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (explaining that
Congress, under pressure from interest groups, may choose to make an agency independent
to shield it from the President’s removal and management powers).
194. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 105, at 600 (identifying removal restrictions
as key in differentiating independent agencies from executive agencies).
195. See VIVIAN S. CHU & DANIEL T. SHEDD , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42720, PRESIDENTIAL
REVIEW OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKING : LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2012).
196. Id. However, as commentators have noted, the Solicitor General, who reports to the
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influence. The President may deploy powers of selection, management, and persuasion to influence independent commissions. The
operation of each can be informed by commissioner separate
statements.
The relative independence of these commissions is premised, first
and foremost, on the absence of presidential authority to remove
commissioners without cause.197 However, the President maintains
the authority to appoint independent commissioners with the advice
and consent of the Senate and to designate commission chairs.198
This selection power makes it more likely that nominees will be
sympathetic to the President’s policy priorities and perhaps even
more open to White House influence.199 Further, by designating the
commission chair, the President has the power to endow one particularly loyal individual with significant management and agendasetting authority.200
For the President to use her selection powers effectively, however,
she must be able to verify the faithfulness of her chosen agents.
While she has no removal recourse in the case of unfaithfulness,
information about fidelity will likely inform future selections. For
example, if there is evidence that a commissioner has become firmly
opposed to a particular presidential policy priority, the President
may seek to appoint future commissioners who will more reliably
President, controls independent agency litigation once it reaches the Supreme Court. See Neal
Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 287-88 (1994); Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority
and Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General, 77 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1080, 1088-89 (2009)
(using the FTC as a case study to argue that the Solicitor General limits independent agencies’ abilities to press arguments that conflict with the President’s preferences in the Supreme
Court).
197. Congressional authority to create such independent commissions was recognized in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935), which upheld limitations
on presidential removal authority over FTC Commissioners, id. at 631-32. See also Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686-93 (1988) (citing Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 602, with
approval and extending its logic to the Office of the Independent Counsel).
198. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670 (noting that the President may appoint principal officers
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and may appoint inferior officers alone).
199. As one commentator put it, independent commissioners cannot “hope to survive
through the normal eight-year tenure of a President who does not like them.” Kenneth C.
Cole, Presidential Influence on Independent Agencies, 221 ANNALS AM . ACAD . POL. & SOC. SCI.
72, 74 (1942).
200. None of these powers is unqualified. As discussed in Part I.B.2, in periods of divided
government, the Senate may withhold its consent to the President’s nominees unless the nominees are “batched” with minority commissioners who are party loyalists. See supra note 137.
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vote according to the President’s preferences on that particular
issue. The logic here is not unlike that governing Supreme Court
nominations. A President cannot withdraw a nomination after a
Justice is confirmed, but if a Justice turns out to espouse particular
views that are not in line with the President’s, the President can
prioritize those issues in selecting her next nominee.
Commissioner separate statements are perhaps the most reliable evidence of a commissioner’s positions on the issues. Unlike
judicial opinions, commission decisions adopted by the majority are
not “authored” by a single commissioner.201 It is therefore not possible to determine a single commissioner’s preferences from the text
of those decisions. While statements concurrent with voting—such
as the oral statements made by FERC Commissioners at Commission meetings or the written statements that NRC Commissioners
attach to staff issue papers—offer similar insights, they are less easily monitored by presidential staff than are separate statements
published in the Federal Register.202 Press releases and other public
statements might provide similar information, but these are not
routinely issued by commissioners across agencies.203
Presidents may also use management tools to influence independent commissions. These include manipulation of budgets and
staffing levels.204 Presidents also review and coordinate agency
rulemaking through OIRA.205 While OIRA’s key requirements are
binding only on executive agencies,206 independent agencies are
exhorted to comply.207 There is some evidence that they do.208 But
201. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part I.B.1.
203. See supra Part I.B.1.
204. In his study of the FTC, Haoran Lu noted that President Nixon requested increased
staffing levels during his efforts to revitalize the Commission while President Reagan limited
the Commission’s ability to operate effectively by reducing staffing levels. Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 PRESIDEN TIAL STUD . Q. 51, 64 (1998).
205. See supra note 13.
206. Most executive orders exempt independent agencies, as defined in the Paperwork Reduction Act. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (excluding “independent regulatory agencies” as defined by statute).
207. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,579 §§ 1-2, 3 C.F.R. 256, 257 (2012) (urging independent
agencies to comply with Executive Order 13,563’s requirements, including the obligation to
conduct retrospective analysis of existing rules).
208. See Anderson P. Heston, The Flip Side of Removal: Bringing Appointment Into the
Removal Conversation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN . SURV. AM . L. 85, 99-100 (2012) (offering evidence that
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determining whether or not compliance has actually occurred can
be challenging. In their separate statements, especially those that
take issue with commission decisions on procedural grounds, commissioners can flag inconsistencies with practices advocated by
OIRA and OMB. For example, such statements might reveal that a
cost-benefit analysis was not performed, or that the analysis neglected a key variable.
More recently, Eloise Pasachoff has suggested that presidents can
exercise significant control over both executive and independent
agencies through OMB’s Resource Management Offices (RMOs).209
Pasachoff identifies seven levers presidents may use to impact agency priorities and actions.210 These include OMB’s ultimate approval
authority over agency budget requests,211 its oversight of agency
spending,212 and the implementation of management initiatives with
substantive policy goals in mind.213 Again, for each of these mechanisms, an understanding of the agency’s current preferences and
priorities will enhance the deployment of control levers. Those
preferences and priorities can be made clearer through review of
separate commissioner statements. For example, if the President
learns via a dissent that a commission may be insufficiently responsive to the concerns of a particular segment of industry, he can
prioritize programs benefitting that industry segment through
budget management.
Finally, a President may influence independent agencies through
persuasion or, as Paul Verkuil put it, “jawboning.”214 Yet here too,
the FTC complied with OIRA Administrator John Graham’s request to modify regulations
regarding lender disclosures); see also OFFICE OF INFO . & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 130 tbl.C-1,
131 tbl.C-2 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_
cb/2011_cba_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X94-JA9X] (showing that many independent agencies engage in some form of cost-benefit calculation).
209. See Pasachoff, supra note 13, at 2191-92.
210. See id. at 2207-08.
211. See id. at 2213-14.
212. See id. at 2228-37.
213. See id. at 2237-43.
214. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM . L. REV. 943, 943-44 (1980). Presidents might also use less formal suasion
to impact intra-agency appointments. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 105, at 644
(recalling former SEC Chairman William Cary’s description of pressure from the Kennedy
White House on agency appointments).
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presidents must have information about agency preferences in order
to effectively influence agencies. Knowing where to exert pressure
requires knowing where commissioners stand. And again, separate
statements provide the clearest indication of each commissioner’s
policy preferences and priorities.
III. DISSENT’S ROLE IN CHECKING ARBITRARINESS
Perhaps even more powerful than dissent’s role in facilitating
agency oversight is its potential to control arbitrariness in agency
decision-making. Many features of independent agencies are intended to promote neutral, expert decision-making. These include term
appointments and removal protections, as well as exemption from
the requirement that major regulations be submitted to review by
the Executive Office of the President.215
This Part will first explore the ways in which commissioner
separate statements contribute to the effective functioning of
independent commissions as expert bodies. Scholars cite independent commissions’ multimember structure as a safeguard of expert
decision-making.216 Part III.A argues that the threat and fact of published separate statements contribute to the effectiveness of this
design tool in enhancing decisional quality.
Part III.A examines ways in which the courts can magnify the
salutary impact of commission dissent. It first describes a series of
cases in the D.C. Circuit embodying what might be called “deliberation-forcing” in that the holdings require commission opinions to
respond to arguments raised in dissents. It then argues that the
doctrine could be used more extensively as a bulwark against arbitrary decision-making. Specifically, courts might deploy other standards of review—in particular Chevron and Auer deference217—in a
similar deliberation-forcing fashion. Finally, it acknowledges the
potential for abuse of deliberation-forcing for deregulatory or
political ends, and suggests ways to mitigate these potential costs.

215. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
216. See Barkow, supra note 21, at 37-39.
217. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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A. Separate Statements and Decision-Making Quality
One key structural feature of independent commissions is their
multimember composition.218 The D.C. Circuit even suggested that
the check provided by multimember composition may be strong
enough to substitute for more direct political oversight.219 Recently,
in the PHH Corp. case, Judge Brett Kavanaugh suggested that
intracommission checking embodied the theory animating the Constitution’s separation of powers: let ambition counteract ambition.220
“The multi-member structure [of independent commissions],”Judge
Kavanaugh concluded, thus “reduces the risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and thereby helps protect individual
liberty.”221
A variety of possible mechanisms exist by which multiple membership might lessen the tendency toward arbitrary decision-making.
Interest groups may find it harder to capture a majority of commissioners than a single agency head.222 Crucially, multiple membership might also improve decisional quality, by “foster[ing] more
deliberative decision making,”223 and/or by ensuring that more
218. Indeed, the original purpose of such commissions was to promote considered, expert
decision-making. Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 777 (“Th[e] goal of impartial expertise
motivated many of the structural features of the early independent agencies.”); see also
Barkow, supra note 21, at 19-26 (arguing that insulation in general, not just from presidential
oversight, is the major driver of the independent commission form).
219. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (referring to this structure as a
“critical substitute check”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted Feb. 16, 2017.
220. See id. at 25-26. Although he technically invoked separation of powers in favor of a
more unitary conception of the executive, one cannot help but feel that Kavanaugh is, to some
extent, a functionalist. Judge Kavanaugh’s functionalism—if it can be so labeled—appeared
to stem, not from his underlying theory of constitutional interpretation, but from a respect for
settled historical practice. See id. at 23 (“[H]istorical practice matters a great deal in defining
the constitutional limits on the Executive and Legislative Branches.”).
221. Id. at 6.
222. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 794 (citing BERNSTEIN , supra note 11, at 70);
see also PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 28 (citing Bressman & Thompson, supra note 105, at 611).
223. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 26 (citing Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 794); see also
Recent Legislation, Dodd-Frank Act, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2128 (2011) (“[T]he presence of
dissenters [in agency proceedings] provides new information and forces the proponent to articulate a coherent rationale, thus acting as a constraining force.”). In another context, dissent
during policy formulation has been found to provide additional information, challenge invalid
assumptions, and reduce the propensity for “groupthink.” Robert S. Dooley & Gerald E.
Fryxell, Attaining Decision Quality and Commitment from Dissent: The Moderating Effects
of Loyalty and Competence in Strategic Decision-Making Teams, 42 ACAD . MGMT. J. 389, 39899 (1999) (studying strategic decision-making by U.S. hospital teams).
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diverse perspectives are brought to bear on the issue before a
commission.224 In other words, multimember decision-making “leads
to better-informed and reasoned policy outcomes from the agency.”225 To the extent that group decision-making tends to hew toward
the middle ground, commission decision-making might also be “superior” in the sense that it limits the adoption of extreme positions.226
Dissent, or at least the threat of dissent, is crucial to the effective
operation of some of these mechanisms. Specifically, it enhances the
positive effect of disagreement on decisional quality. Individual
commissioners have two sources of leverage when it comes to commission decision-making. First, they can threaten to withhold their
votes, which makes it more difficult for the chair to secure a majority. The effectiveness of this tool depends on the breadth of existing
support for a decision. It will have a less pronounced effect when the
chair has sufficient votes to approve the decision with or without the
reluctant commissioner. Second, commissioners can threaten to
make their disagreement public. This approach may be effective
even when the chair still has a majority.
While public disagreement may be aired in may ways, published
separate statements may be particularly embarrassing for the other
commissioners.227 For one thing, published separate statements
are durable. They remain part of the rulemaking for all of posterity, rather than fading from the public consciousness as a press
statement might. In addition, published separate statements are
part of the record for review and are likely to be considered by a reviewing court should the decision be litigated.228 The threat of dissent thus amplifies the relative bargaining strength of individual
224. See PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 26 (citing Breger & Edles, supra note 49, at 1113) (noting
that membership diversity can lead to more thorough ex ante discussion of costs and benefits);
see also Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative
Process, 65 ADMIN . L. REV. 689, 696 (2013) (“[A] multimember board allows for a representation of divergent interests in a way that a single decisionmaker simply cannot.”).
225. Datla & Revesz, supra note 21, at 794.
226. See PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 27.
227. In fact, some commissioners do express verbal, public disagreement with their fellow
commissioners, sometimes in spectacular fashion. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying
text. These extra-procedural statements are perhaps more damaging to the commission’s
reputation than are published separate statements in that they indicate a lack of faith in the
traditional channels of dissent to effectuate change.
228. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
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commissioners. At the margins, these commissioners may be able to
force more careful consideration, or even compromise, than they
could by leveraging the threat of a “no” vote by itself.229
Threats of dissent backed up by actual draft statements can be
even more useful as means of improving a decision’s substance. For
one thing, unlike the mere threat of dissent, a draft signals the author’s commitment to public disagreement.230 For another, when
faced with written objections, the majority might feel a greater compulsion to respond.231 If the dissent’s arguments are well-presented,
they might inspire better, more analytically sound writing by the
majority.232 Judge Marsha Berzon celebrates judicial separate
opinions as an example of what Daniel Kahneman calls “adversarial
collaboration”—the forced grappling with alternative views that
serves to counter cognitive biases.233
Even when the majority opinion does not respond to or even
consider the views expressed in separate opinions, those opinions
can still improve the quality of a body’s overall output, either by
qualifying the majority’s approach or by enhancing it. As an example of the former, Justice Brennan suggests that dissents can do
“damage control” by limiting an overbroad majority opinion.234
Charles Fried put this point another way when he wrote that dissents can “complete[ ]” a majority opinion “by showing what th[e]

229. Cf. Wood, supra note 10, at 1465 (noting that, in the judicial context, the mere threat
of a published dissent can often result in a better-considered majority opinion).
230. See Brennan, supra note 31, at 430-32 (discussing the enduring merits of certain
famous dissents).
231. See id. at 430 (arguing that dissents force the majority to deal with hard questions).
Responding to critiques that appear in separate opinions would be standard practice if the jurisprudence requiring commission majorities to respond to the points raised by their dissenting colleagues became more widely accepted. See infra Part III.B.
232. Writing in tribute to her recently deceased colleague Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that his opinions challenged her “to meet his best efforts with my
own.” Susan Svrluga, George Mason Law School to Be Renamed the Antonin Scalia School of
Law, WASH . POST: GRADE POINT (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2016/03/31/george-mason-law-school-to-be-renamed-the-antonin-scalia-school-of-law/
[https://perma.cc/D6GA-C8Q2].
233. Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
1479, 1483-84 (2012) (quoting Daniel Kahneman, Experiences of Collaborative Research, 58
AM . PSYCHOL. 723, 729-30 (2003)).
234. Brennan, supra note 31, at 430; see also Wood, supra note 10, at 1452-56 (suggesting
that dissent can establish the majority opinion’s limits).
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opinion is not.”235 Dissents and concurrences might also serve as a
guide to majority opinions by drawing attention to critical facts.236
In all of these cases, the separate statements enhance the visibility
of the commission’s reasoning, reducing the arbitrariness of the
overall output.
The next Section turns to ways in which the courts might enhance
these salutary effects.
B. Separate Statements and Deliberation-Forcing
Other governmental actors can enhance the effectiveness of internal agency checks. Given that both the threat and practice of drafting separate statements can have a salutary effect on decisional
quality, what role, if any, can the judiciary play in promoting its
benefits?
Courts do pay attention to separate statements, citing to them in
a number of contexts. Many acknowledgements are in passing: commissioner dissents and concurrences are frequently reported in the
procedural sections of judicial opinions, for example.237 Judges
sometimes cite separate statements to support their own majority238 or dissenting239 views. In other cases, a judge may disagree
235. Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Comment: Five to Four: Reflections
on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 179 (2002).
236. See Wood, supra note 10, at 1453-54.
237. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1960) (reporting the
comments of one concurring Commissioner on the underlying order and noting that three
other Commissioners dissented); Nat’l Ass’n of Broads. v. FCC, 789 F.3d 165, 170 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (noting that two Commissioners dissented in part from the Commission’s order); Cellco
P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reviewing the argument of the two dissenting Commissioners); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(outlining the dissenting Commissioners’ major arguments in opposition to the underlying
rule); Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (explaining the two dissenting Commissioners’ arguments, which one of the parties to the instant rulemaking relied upon), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1
(2002).
238. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1986)
(citing the dissenting Commissioners’ reasoning with approval); Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v.
FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (relying on an explanation in Commissioner Pai’s
dissent); Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing
arguments of two dissenting Commissioners and noting that they were “plainly correct”).
239. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 556 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing a dissenting Commissioner’s reference to the case underlying the policy
that the FCC abandoned in the underlying rulemaking); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
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with a commissioner’s dissent but feel compelled to respond.240 In
still others, a judge may believe the concurring or dissenting
commissioner has the better argument but still uphold the commission decision.241
Courts also use commissioner separate statements in a way that
impacts the agency more squarely: to invalidate the commission majority’s position under “arbitrary and capricious” review. This move
is “deliberation-forcing” in that it incentivizes commissioners to
work out their differences in advance (or at least to respond to each
other’s arguments). It is thus consistent with existing doctrines that
incentivize procedural adjustments at agencies as opposed to (or in
addition to) focusing on substantive outcomes. Consider, for example, the APA’s requirement, as interpreted by the courts, that an
agency respond to public comments on a proposed rule so long as
they are of “cogent materiality.”242 This response requirement necessarily implies that such comments be considered as part of the agency’s decision-making process.243 Similarly, requiring that an agency
361, 414-15 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the dissenting Commissioner’s view to support argument that Commission decisions were value-laden); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 164-65 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing with dissenting Commissioner that FCC programming review had a chilling effect
on broadcast expression); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Mikva, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for its reliance on a Commissioner dissent);
Wisc. Elec. Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567 F.2d 735, 738-40 (7th Cir. 1977) (Pell, J., dissenting)
(adopting unpublished Commissioner’s dissent as his own and reproducing it in full).
240. See, e.g., Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Commissioner Johnson’s
lengthy dissenting discussion, compels us to interject a word of explanation regarding the
matter of analogy to [a line of cases that the court ultimately found distinguishable].”).
241. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. FCC, 717 F.2d 1471, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding Commission decision but agreeing with dissenting Commissioners that dicta should
have been disapproved); Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 668 F.2d 880, 887-88 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing
concurring Commissioner opinion at length to support its admonition that “[a]lthough we
affirm the conclusion reached by the Commission, we do not intend to express complete satisfaction with its opinion”); Am. Pub. Gas Ass’n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(finding presumption of reasonableness not overcome and upholding the Commission’s decision even though support offered for its approach was “thin” and its response to the dissenting Commissioner was “weak”); Citizens for Allegan Cty., Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125,
1132 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (hinting that court would have adopted position of dissenting
Commissioner under a different standard of review).
242. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
a failure to address such comments in the final rule constituted a breach of APA § 553(c)).
243. A more extreme version of the doctrine is that adopted by Judge Bazelon in the Ethyl
Corp. case, in which he identified the proper role of the judge in “hard look” review under
State Farm to involve scrutiny of an agency’s decision-making process alone. See Ethyl Corp.
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justify a rulemaking based on the record before if at the time— rather than post hoc, during litigation—supports deliberation values.244
This list is not exhaustive, but it demonstrates that deliberationforcing is not a new concept, and that it would therefore be unsurprising if some form of the doctrine underlay the D.C. Circuit’s
holdings on consideration of commissioner dissent. And as Part
III.B.2 suggests, there are opportunities for the courts to expand
this move to the review of commission interpretations of text under
the Chevron doctrine.
1. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
In applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,
courts have on occasion shown special solicitude for the views of
dissenting commissioners. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
particular has found commission actions arbitrary and capricious
when a commission majority failed to consider an alternative proposed by a dissenting commissioner. Consider Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, in which the D.C. Circuit reviewed an SEC rule
requiring that certain mutual funds have an independent board
chairman.245 Two dissenting Commissioners had proposed that, in
lieu of requiring an independent chairman, the rule should require
funds to disclose any chair conflicts of interest.246 The D.C. Circuit
held that the SEC’s failure to consider disclosure as an alternative
to an independent chair was arbitrary and capricious.247
The requirement that an agency consider reasonable alternatives to its proposal dates back to State Farm.248 That requirement
did not obviously apply to alternatives raised in a commissioner’s

v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring). Bazelon argued that
judges were ill equipped to review the complex subject matter of agency decisions, and that
hewing to procedural oversight would prevent judicial activism. See id. at 66-67.
244. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON , LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
573, 580 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the possible benefits of requiring an agency to set forth its
reasoning at length in final rules).
245. 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
246. See id. at 144.
247. See id. at 144-45.
248. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
48, 50-51 (1983) (invalidating a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
rule for failure to consider alternative way of achieving statutory objectives).
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concurrence or dissent. However, nothing about such an application
seems obviously inconsistent with State Farm’s approach.
A few years later, however, the D.C. Circuit extended its consideration requirement to arguments raised by dissenting commissioners.249 In American Gas Ass’n v. FERC, the court invalidated certain
FERC revisions to financial forms and reporting rules for interstate
natural gas pipelines because the Commission had failed to “acknowledge and consider” the arguments raised in then-Commissioner Wellinghoff ’s dissenting opinion.250 The Commission, the
court continued, had also failed to provide a “direct response” to
Commissioner Wellinghoff ’s arguments.251 The court recently reiterated the “direct response” requirement in Electric Power Supply
Ass’n v. FERC, in which the majority found a rate set by the
Commission arbitrary and capricious due to its failure to “properly
consider” and “engage” the arguments raised in a dissent by Commissioner Moeller.252
Nothing in American Gas Ass’n or Electric Power Supply Ass’n requires a commission to actually adopt a dissenting commissioner’s
approach—a commission need only consider and respond to it.253 In
this sense, the holdings are similar to judicial interpretations of
section 553(c) of the APA requiring responses to significant public
comments.254 But the fact that these arguments come from other
commissioners, rather than the public or somewhere else, suggests
an additional justification for the doctrine. By requiring that reasonable arguments raised in separate opinions be considered and addressed in the majority opinion, courts encourage greater dialogue
between commission members.255 For that reason, this weak form of
special solicitude for the alternatives and arguments raised by

249. See Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 593 F.3d 14, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Laclede Gas
Co. v. FERC, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (finding that FERC was required to consider reasonable alternatives raised by parties to a proceeding).
250. Id. at 15-16, 20.
251. Id. at 20.
252. 753 F.3d 216, 224-25 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
253. Note that the consideration and response requirements likely apply only to final rules,
as preliminary rulemaking documents are largely insulated from judicial review under the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing for review of “final agency action” only unless other
actions are made reviewable by statute).
254. See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
255. See supra Part III.A.
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dissenting commissioners might be called “deliberation-forcing.”256
The chairman and her staff are more likely to respond to the views
of individual commissioners if they know that, should they fail to do
so, and should those commissioners later decide to memorialize
their views in a separate statement, the commission decision risks
being overturned by the courts.257 Because it forces more careful consideration of certain issues by commissioners, deliberation-forcing
might produce better-quality decisions.258
Notwithstanding the basic soundness of deliberation-forcing, a
few concerns are worth noting. The first relates to the contours of
the doctrine. Chamber of Commerce limited the required consideration of alternatives proposed by the dissent to those not “frivolous,”
“out of bounds,” or otherwise “unworthy of consideration,”259 and
American Gas Ass’n adopted these limits.260 Nowhere, however, did
either court define these terms or provide examples of what proposals or arguments might be “unworthy.” Commissions attempting
to determine which dissenting statements require a response are
therefore left with little guidance and may interpret the obligation
either too broadly or too narrowly. If they interpret it too narrowly
and respond to too few dissenting statements, they may suffer costly
judicial reversals. This risk may lead them to interpret the obligation more broadly than necessary. However, if they do, they may
256. This phrase is a play on “expertise-forcing,” coined by Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
257. In fact, commission staff members indicated that the agencies were indeed modifying
their practices in response to these decisions, providing greater opportunity for circulation of
and response to commissioner separate statements in the majority decision.
258. Alternatively, as the D.C. Circuit recognized earlier in its history, the presence of published dissents might itself be an indication of careful commission consideration. In upholding
an FPC order authorizing a natural gas pipeline, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the “vigorous
dissent” by two Commissioners in finding that the Commission had given the case “close
scrutiny.” Fla. Econ. Advisory Council v. FPC, 251 F.2d 643, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The content
of a dissent might serve the same function. See, e.g., Common Carrier Conference v. United
States, 534 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (“That the attention of the [Interstate
Commerce] Commission was focused on the matter is clear enough from the analysis in Commissioner Clapp’s dissent.”).
259. 412 F.3d 113, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
260. 593 F.3d 14, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 145).
These limiting principles were nominally rooted in the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence on FERCapproved settlements. In Laclede Gas Co. v. FERC, the court held that “where a party raises
facially reasonable alternatives to FERC’s decision to reject a contested settlement, the agency must either consider those alternatives or give some reason ... for declining to do so.” 873
F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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spend valuable time and resources responding to “frivolous” alternatives and arguments raised by their dissenting colleagues.
The risk of overresponse might seem either small or at least insufficiently serious to outweigh the deliberation-forcing benefits of the
doctrine. Consider, however, that not all commissions are as conservative in their dissenting practices as are FERC and the SEC. The
doctrine might produce different results on the FCC, which has a
much higher dissent rate and where dissenting commissioners tend
to be much less restrained in their opposition.261 Were FCC Commissioners in the majority in any given case to feel a greater obligation
to respond to all of the comments raised in separate statements, the
pace of both rulemaking and adjudications could be significantly
slowed.262
Second, deliberation-forcing might not operate as smoothly on administrative commissions as it might on multimember courts, for
reasons that may not be immediately apparent to the authors of the
doctrine. Judges may picture commission processes as similar to
their own, imagining that draft opinions are regularly circulated
and that opportunities to meet informally to discuss drafts are unrestricted. On at least some independent commissions, however, the
picture is more complicated. As discussed in Part I.B.1, drafts of
separate opinions at FERC are not typically circulated for comment. In part, this is due to timing; Commissioners typically do not
draft their own separate statements until after the official commission vote on the matter.263 These statements are then completed between the commission vote and the issuance of the opinion.264 This
gives the other Commissioners very little time to respond to new
261. See supra Parts I.A.1.c, I.B.
262. One might think that because dissenting commissioner views are also likely to be
reflected in public comments to the agency (or are likely to reflect them), and because the
agency is already obligated to respond to “significant” public comments, see Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015), “deliberation forcing” is uneccesary. However,
even if the sets of arguments raised in public comments and those raised in commissioner
separate statements currently overlap (a point that would require empirical confirmation),
this need not always be the case. Individual commissioners could produce separate statements
that raise entirely new arguments, which must then be considered by the agency in order to
survive rationality review.
263. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. In some cases, statements may even
be written and issued after the Commission decision itself has been issued. See supra Part
I.B.1.
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arguments or alternatives raised in the separate statements, and
issuance of the (often time-sensitive) opinions may be delayed as a
result.
In addition, “[u]nlike the judges of the federal judiciary, members
of administrative commissions do not do their own work.”265 Drafting of opinions is delegated to commission staff. Unlike a judge
working in close collaboration with a small number of law clerks,
majority commission decisions are delegated in most cases to opinion-writing sections or other specialized staff. Thus, James Landis’s
observations of half a century ago translate nicely to this context:
deliberation-forcing solutions require “broad changes in the
presuppositions that the [courts] h[ave] been led to believe underlies
the work of our regulatory agencies.”266 If greater deliberation
between commissioners is the goal, requiring the majority statement to respond to arguments raised in dissent may not be sufficient to achieve it.267
Compounding each of these problems is the possibility that, were
the deliberation-forcing doctrine to be embraced more broadly, it
might result in an increase in the number of separate commission
opinions. Although deliberation-forcing may increase the willingness of commissioners in the majority to reach compromises with
colleagues who disagree, for commissioners who still do not feel that
their views are adequately reflected in the majority approach, the
calculus changes. The deliberation-forcing doctrine makes writing
separately much more attractive, since doing so is more likely to
trigger a reversal of the commission decision.268 Thus, the doctrine
may produce separate opinions in situations where we might otherwise think that the costs of dissent outweigh its potential benefits.269
265. LANDIS REPORT, supra note 98, at 19. Based on conversations with current and former
Commissioners and staff, this observation remains accurate today with respect to the drafting
of rules and other decisions.
266. Id. at 20.
267. If, however, the goal is to encourage more dialogue and debate among commission staff
more generally, or between the staff of individual commissioners and those who draft majority
opinions and rules, then the D.C. Circuit’s approach will be more effective. The concern about
the timing of separate statement issuance, however, still remains.
268. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
269. See infra Part IV. If taken too far, this additional incentive to write separately could
produce considerable legal uncertainty. This is because, at least on occasion, commission votes
could become so fractured that there is no clear majority position. See, e.g., Breger & Edles,
supra note 49, at 1182 n.355 (citing an NLRB case from 1995 in which the Commission split
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2. Interpretive Deference
The basic steps of Chevron deference, under which judges review
many agency interpretations of statutory text, are by now familiar.270 As a preliminary matter, a court decides whether the agency
interpretation has the “force of law,” an inquiry that precludes deference for more informal agency statements.271 Then the court determines whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at
issue or whether the statutory text is ambiguous.272 If there is
ambiguity, the court will defer to a reasonable agency interpretation.273
Judges might use Chevron review, like State Farm review, as a
deliberation-forcing device. Under Chevron’s second step, judges
must ask whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision is reasonable.274 Dissents can complicate this
analysis in the same way that they can complicate arbitrary and
capricious review.275 Namely, if even one commissioner disagrees
with the majority’s interpretation of statutory text, it can be a reasonableness “red flag.” It might even be argued that, if the heads of
a commission cannot agree about statutory meaning, courts should
not cite the agency’s relative expertise advantage as a justification
for deference.276
That courts do defer to agency interpretations when the agency is
itself divided on the correct meaning of the statutory provision
might mean one of three things. First, the court might not be relying
on the expertise justification for Chevron deference. Second, the
2-1-1 and the D.C. Circuit reversed, without examining the plurality opinion, after finding the
concurring Commissioner’s reasoning contrary to the governing statute).
270. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
271. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
272. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
273. See id. at 844.
274. See id.
275. The Supreme Court recognized the substantial overlap between the two analyses, noting that under Chevron step two, a court does not substitute its own interpretation unless the
agency’s is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011) (quoting Household
Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).
276. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 196-97 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, itself for the
proposition that Congress may have desired courts to defer to agency interpretations due to
agencies’ greater subject matter expertise).
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court might have concluded that agencies are especially better
suited to interpret statutory text vis-à-vis courts when commission
members cannot agree on the correct interpretation. Third, the
court might have concluded agency expertise is not negatively
impacted by disagreement among independent commissioners.
Regardless of which of these theories is correct, however, the courts
have failed to square their approach to Chevron with the D.C. Circuit’s deliberation-forcing doctrine under State Farm.
The expertise rationale is sometimes tied to an agency’s closer ties
to legislators, better understanding of industry-specific terminology,
and day-to-day experience of industry operations.277 But the expertise rationale might break down if commissioners, each of whom
presumably benefits from these advantages, are still at odds over
the correct interpretation of a given statutory provision. Perhaps, in
such cases, courts should understand agencies’ relative interpretive
advantages as more muted.
Alternatively, courts might understand “agency expertise” as referring not merely to the experience and qualifications of individual
commissioners, but to the resources of the commission as a whole.278
According to this view, disagreement and deliberation are part of a
necessary process that allows the commission to realize the full
benefits of its expertise and to produce an ultimate conclusion
worthy of deference. Published separate opinions, by this account,
are mere artifacts of the very process that is in part responsible for
agencies’ comparative advantage over courts when it comes to
statutory understanding.
A final possibility is that courts believe that if two expert decision makers disagree about the proper interpretation of a statute
they have been authorized to administer, generalist judges would be
even less competent to interpret that particular provision.279 In
other words, interpretive disagreement on a commission flags particularly thorny interpretive problems. These thorny interpretive
problems, we might think, are even more appropriately resolved by
the subject-matter experts.
277. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1286-87 (2008).
278. Cf. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 575 (1985) (citing agencies’ superior interpretive resources as justification for deference).
279. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 197.
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No matter which of these views most accurately describes judicial
motivations, courts should consider harmonizing their approach to
Chevron deference in the presence of one or more commission dissents with the D.C. Circuit’s deliberation-forcing approach to State
Farm review. There is no obvious reason why an agency’s action
should be considered arbitrary for failure to consider a commissioner’s reasoning. A deliberation-forcing approach to Chevron would
require that, in order to receive deference for its interpretation of
statutory text, an agency must show that it has considered a dissenting commissioner’s interpretation and any reasons put forth to
support that interpretation.
One missed opportunity for judicial deliberation-forcing under
Chevron occurred in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Piedmont
Environmental Council v. FERC.280 The case concerned FERC’s interpretation of a section of the Federal Power Act permitting the
Commission to preempt state authority to site certain electric transmission lines if a state had “withheld approval for more than 1 year”
after a permit application had been filed.281 In the underlying administrative proceeding, Commissioner Kelly chastised the majority
for failing to give the plain language of the Act adequate consideration.282
The Fourth Circuit found, at Chevron step one, that the statutory
text clearly precluded FERC’s interpretation.283 Yet although the
court noted Commissioner Kelly’s dissent in describing the case’s
procedural history,284 it failed to mention the Commissioner’s dissent in the analysis section. A deliberation-forcing approach might
instead have bypassed Chevron step one, concluding only that even
if the statute were ambiguous, the Commission majority’s failure to
devote adequate consideration to Commissioner Kelly’s argument
rendered its interpretation unreasonable.

280. 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).
281. Id. at 310-12 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(c)(i)). For more details on the Federal
Power Act provision and its implications, see generally R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section
216 of EPACT, 108 COLUM . L. REV. 404 (2008).
282. See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 311.
283. See id. at 315 (“Because Congress’s intent is clear, our review under Chevron proceeds
no further.”).
284. See id. at 311.
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Alternatively, in order to reach step two of Chevron, the court
might have found that statutory language is presumptively ambiguous if expert administrators cannot agree about its meaning.285
Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner have addressed a related question
in their writings on The Votes of Other Judges.286 They propose a hypothetical Supreme Court conference in which five Justices opine
that statutory language unambiguously means X, whereas the other
four Justices assert that the same language unambiguously means
Y.287 They further suppose that each Justice has a relatively high
level of confidence in his or her own interpretation.288 In that
scenario, Vermeule and Posner conclude, notwithstanding each
Justice’s confidence, each should reconsider in light of their colleagues’ conclusions, and the Court should ultimately find the statute ambiguous.289
Similar reasoning might be applied to judicial review of an agency
interpretation from which one or more commissioners dissented.
While the determination of ambiguity under Chevron step one is
ultimately a task for the judge rather than the agency,290 the fact
that the agency experts disagreed about meaning should provide
valuable information to the court about textual certainty.291
285. Of course, if an agency can come up with an unreasonable interpretation of a statute
it is authorized to administer, a single commissioner can certainly do the same. A dissenting
commissioner might fundamentally misconstrue statutory language, for example, or use his
or her dissent to manipulate review by the courts. Even if these cases are rare, in neither
scenario would a finding of textual ambiguity necessarily be appropriate.
286. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges 1-2 (Harvard Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-04, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723957 [https://perma.cc/YTU8-TL57].
287. Id. at 3-4.
288. Id. at 15-17.
289. Id. at 17.
290. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
(identifying courts as “the final authority on issues of statutory construction” and instructing
judges to employ “traditional tools of statutory construction” in assessing ambiguity).
291. Indeed, one state court has taken the position that, in the tax context at least, “[t]he
test of statutory ambiguity is whether the statute is capable of being construed in two different ways by reasonably well-informed persons.” Kollasch v. Adamany, 313 N.W.2d 47, 5152 (Wis. 1981).
Stephenson and Vermeule argue that the ambiguity inquiry collapses into the reasonableness inquiry. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 599 (proposing that the ambiguity inquiry is “nothing more than a special case of Step Two”). The authors contend that
the task of the judge under Chevron is simply to define the “zone of ambiguity” of a particular
passage. Id. at 601. Under this approach, the fact that a commission of experts failed to agree
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This case for ambiguity might be especially strong where, as in
Piedmont, both the commission and the judicial panel are divided on
statutory meaning.292 One might criticize the Chevron doctrine for
removing interpretive authority from interpretive experts (the
courts) and bestowing it on subject-matter experts (the agency
decision makers).293 Without opining on the wisdom of this arrangement, it seems reasonable that when both the subject-matter experts and the interpretive experts disagree internally about the
meaning of a statutory phrase, that phrase should be deemed ambiguous.294
Thus, Chevron might be transformed into a deliberation-forcing
doctrine at either step one or step two. If commissions know that
their interpretations are likely to receive less deference in the presence of an interpretive dissent, they will have a greater incentive to
reach agreement on statutory meaning. When this is not possible,
the majority will at least have an incentive to offer a thoughtful
response to the arguments made by their dissenting colleagues.
IV. EVALUATING DISSENT
Dissent is neither a uniform good nor an unqualified evil: its benefits and costs depend largely on context. In science, for example,
dissent is essential to test theories and expose their flaws.295 In the
military, by contrast, the need for coordination in dangerous, rapidly

on the best interpretation of the statute might give the courts some idea as to the dimensions
of that zone.
292. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 311, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2009); id.
at 320 (Traxler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
293. For example, the APA seems to envision that courts will be the primary interpreters
of statutory text. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (proclaiming that “the reviewing court shall ...
interpret ... statutory provisions”).
294. One wrinkle emphasized by William Baude in his critique of Posner and Vermeule’s
approach is that judges do not apply a uniform interpretive theory to statutory text. See Will
Baude, Does Judicial Disagreement Imply Ambiguity?, WASH . POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/17/
does-judicial-disagreement-imply-ambiguity/?utm_term=.c02cf101cd57 [https://perma.cc/
7HJ9-K9S3]. Posner and Vermeule’s convincing rejoinder is that “epistemic humility” should
lead judges to reconsider their position on textual certainty under these conditions as well.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 286, at 6.
295. See Berzon, supra note 233, at 1484.
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evolving scenarios may require that opportunities for dissent be
channeled so as to avoid endangering personnel and civilians.296
In the administrative context, the question is even more nuanced.
From a societal perspective, administrative dissent’s benefits and
costs fall into three broad categories: substantive, institutional, and
democratic. Part III discussed the substantive impacts of dissent.
The following Sections will therefore explore institutional and democratic costs and benefits of administrative dissents in more detail.
A. Institutional Costs and Benefits
The institutional benefits and costs of separate statements in
general, and dissents in particular, relate primarily to reputation,
collegiality, and resources. In terms of institutional reputation,
dissents can either be a boon, demonstrating the independence of
decision makers and the seriousness with which they view their
task, or a curse, depriving the institution of its reputation for solidarity and impartiality. If used as a substitute for healthy internal
debate or if less than respectful in tone, separate statements can
also weaken collegiality within the agency. Finally, separate statements demand commissioner and staff attention and resources, and
may come at the expense of other pressing work.
1. Institutional Legitimacy
Dissents likely have no direct effect on a government body’s decision-making legitimacy. Justice Scalia, in a 1994 lecture, defended
that position as follows:
It seems to me that in a democratic society the authority of a
bench of judges, like the authority of a legislature, or the authority of an executive officer, depends quite simply upon a grant of
power from the people. And if the terms of the grant are that the
majority vote shall prevail, then that is all the authority that is
required—for a court no less than for a legislature or for a multimember executive.297

296. See Masur, supra note 12, at 507-08.
297. Scalia, supra note 32, at 35.
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Even Justice Scalia, however, acknowledged that the public may be
less willing to accept a divided decision.298 This and related impacts
might be called the second-order effects of dissent on institutional
reputation and legitimacy.
In the literature on judicial behavior, theories about the relationship between separate opinions and institutional reputation fall into
three main camps. One view is that decisional unanimity is reputation enhancing, while separate opinions weaken the institution.
Adherents of this view include Chief Justice John Marshall, during
whose tenure the Court produced remarkably few divided opinions.299 More than a century after Marshall first stressed the importance of unanimity, Judge Learned Hand spoke out against
dissent due to its tendency to “cancel[ ] the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.”300 That solidarity can reinforce outsiders’ impression of the
courts as impartial and fair.301 According to Seventh Circuit Judge
Diane Wood, a court’s reputation and legitimacy stem, at least in
part, from its status as an apolitical institution.302 Published dissents can weaken this perception, suggesting that ours is a government of men, not of laws.303 Even staunch supporters of dissent have
recognized that, unchecked, dissent can negatively impact status
and, as a result, institutional mission.304
Interviews with current and former Commissioners and their
staff suggest that commission chairs are not blind to the reputational benefits of unanimous decisions. While more research is
needed to understand the breakdown of divided votes by Chairs at
various agencies, anecdotal evidence does suggest that, as in the
298. See id.
299. See G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA . L.
REV. 1, 34 (1984). Chief Justice John Roberts espouses a similar philosophy, believing that
it is the duty of a Chief Justice to secure unanimity whenever possible. See Jeffrey Rosen,
Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/ [https://perma.cc/6BLP-YQ7S].
300. LEARNED HAND , THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
301. See Rosen, supra note 299 (“In [Chief Justice] Roberts’s view, ... closely divided, 5-4
decisions make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution that
transcends partisan politics.”).
302. Wood, supra note 10, at 1462-63.
303. See id. (noting that the tone of the dissent can strengthen or weaken this perception
with an approach that is too “human,” suggesting that politics predominate over law).
304. See Guinier, supra note 10, at 128.
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courts,305 some commission chairs prioritize unanimity more than
others.306
A second view of the impact of dissent on an institution’s reputation is that published dissents burnish, rather than weaken, that
reputation. A court’s reputation, according to Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes, depends on “the character and independence of the
judges.”307 Better to dissent, he concluded, than to sacrifice independence for unanimity.308 Justice Scalia agreed, arguing that
dissents make plain that the Court’s “decisions are the product of
independent and thoughtful minds” and that judges “do not simply
‘go along’ for some supposed ‘good of the institution.’”309
Perhaps the public in particular prefers openness to ceremony.310
Dan Kahan suggests that to conceal that a question facing the Court
is difficult—even divisive—is to engage in implausible subterfuge.311
Kahan’s target was certitude in both majority and dissenting
opinions, and he did not address the desirability of dissents qua dissents. Nonetheless, his logic suggests that unanimity in the face of
genuine disagreement on the bench would cause those who disagreed with an institution’s rulings to form “an exaggerated assessment” of the institution’s single-mindedness, resulting in a

305. See, e.g., White, supra note 299, at 36 (identifying the Marshall Court’s seniority practice as one device for ensuring unanimity).
306. Compare, Timothy Karr, FCC Chairman Wheeler Fought to Defend the Open Internet
and Protect the Rights of Consumers, FREE PRESS (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.freepress.
net/press-release/107708/fcc-chairman-wheeler-fought-defend-open-internet-and-protectrights-consumers [https://perma.cc/MK9M-5SWG] (quoting the website’s president and CEO
as noting that Chairman Wheeler’s legacy will be judged “not by the number of unanimous
votes but by actual accomplishments”), with Scott J. Wallsten, The Partisan FCC, TECH . POL’Y
INST. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2016/02/16/the-partisan-fcc/ [https://
perma.cc/WEU4-D4DQ] (reporting that FTC votes split along party lines more frequently
under Chairman Tom Wheeler than under any previous commissioner dating back to 1994).
307. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS FOUNDATIONS, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 67 (Garden City Publ’g Co. 1936)
(1929).
308. Id. at 68.
309. Scalia, supra note 32, at 35.
310. According to Lani Guinier, “The Supreme Court enhances its authority by engaging
the public through tempered, direct communication.” Guinier, supra note 10, at 115.
311. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60-61
(2011).
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mischaracterization of the institution’s decision makers as “deluded,
dishonest, or both.”312
Like courts, commissions are made up of experts whose independence may well enhance a commission’s reputation in the eyes of
sophisticated observers. Many observers, including members of the
public, however, are not knowledgeable consumers of decisional
substance, especially when it comes to administrative rules and
orders. Few members of the public are likely to take the time to read
Federal Register notices in their entirety and to admire the independent views of commissioners who write separately. Thus, the
risk that observers will count noses rather than pay attention to
the nuances of the debate is greater for agencies than for courts. In
addition, agency legitimacy is more difficult to establish than judicial legitimacy,313 making agencies more vulnerable to charges of
politicization and capture. Thus the risk that dissent will signal
weakness rather than strength may be more pronounced for administrative commissions than for courts. For those concerned about
the effects of politics on commission decision-making, decisions that
split along party lines, like those at the FCC,314 may be particularly
worrisome.
A final argument about the effects of dissent on institutional
reputation, suggested by Todd Henderson, is that dissent can both
weaken and strengthen institutions: its effect depends on sociopolitical context.315 Focusing on the Supreme Court, Henderson
contrasts the differing approaches taken by two Chief Justices.
First, he explores Chief Justice Marshall’s emphasis on unanimity
“to assert the authority of the judiciary in the fledgling days of
American democracy.”316 Then, he cites Chief Justice Harlan Stone’s
encouragement of dissent in order to avoid backlash as the Court
waded into polarizing social debates during the New Deal.317 Both
strategies, Henderson contends, were attempts to enhance the
312. See id. Kahan noted these effects in the context of studies of motivated cognition
among rival cultural groups. Id. at 60. But his logic applies equally well to the relationship
between institutional decision makers and the public.
313. See Jacobs, supra note 25, at 589 (describing the administrative state’s legitimacy
deficit).
314. See supra Part I.B.2.
315. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 287.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 325-30.
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Court’s legitimacy.318 Henderson’s approach validates both theories,
each of which has its own internal logic, about the relationship
between dissent and reputation.319 Essentially, Henderson concludes, the reputational effects of dissent are context-dependent.320
Henderson’s theory helps us understand when separate opinions
may be helpful in the administrative context and when they may be
more costly than beneficial. Today, to an even greater extent than
courts, agencies seek to build and maintain positive reputations
with other institutional actors, with relevant stakeholders, and with
the general public.321 This is because agencies in general, and independent commissions in particular, occupy an uneasy position in
government. Sitting somewhere between the legislative and executive, independent commissions have been dubbed a “headless ‘fourth
branch.’”322 Their very constitutionality has been questioned, as
have various aspects of their structures and powers.323
For these reasons, independent commissions have special incentives to avoid attack by burnishing their reputations as confident,
reasonable regulators. However, per Henderson, whether agencies
should seek to enhance their status and reputation by speaking with
a single, unified voice or by being as transparent as possible about
disagreement among commissioners will depend on social and
political context. New commissions seeking to establish their reputations as trustworthy stewards may tend toward consensus in
their early years.324 Independent commissions might also prioritize
unanimity in the face of external political opposition. By contrast,

318. See id. at 338-39.
319. See id. at 343-44.
320. See id. at 331.
321. See Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Reputation and Public Administration,
72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 26, 27-28 (2012) (exploring the relationship between agency reputation
and agency autonomy); see also DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER : ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (describing the FDA’s
efforts to build its reputation over time as a way of enhancing its own power).
322. See Strauss, supra note 26, at 578 (quoting PRESIDENTIAL COMM . ON ADMIN . MGMT .,
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1937)).
323. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 25, at 6-8; Lawson, supra note 25, at 1246-48. For
a decided answer to Hamburger’s question, see Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV . 1547,
1547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra note 25) (refuting Hamburger’s “dark vision of
lawless and unchecked power”).
324. Cf. Scalia, supra note 32, at 35 (noting that unanimity may be more appropriate “when
a newly established court is just starting out”).
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more established bodies in more sympathetic political environments
may worry less about reputation and feel freer to publicize internal
disagreement.
Subject matter might also counsel discretion when it comes to the
issuance of published separate statements. The NRC has elected a
middle road that allows for the airing of separate views and yet presents a unified front.325 It does so by including separate statements
from each Commissioner in notational voting records available on
the Agency’s website, while at the same time publishing few separate opinions attached to final orders and rules.326 This approach
was likely driven by the desire to allay the public’s considerable
fears surrounding nuclear power through greater transparency
while, at the same time, reassuring the public that safety regulations had the backing of the full Commission.327
Other compromise positions are possible. The reputational goals
of unanimity might be served, if slightly less effectively, by separate
statements that remain respectful in tone. More respectful separate
statements may serve to enhance reputation by suggesting that
commission decision-making is measured and dispassionate. Separate statements that are especially antagonistic to or dismissive of
the commission majority, however, may undermine public trust in
the commission as a whole. This is especially true if those statements go beyond merely expressing a different view and accuse the
majority commissioners of blatant wrongheadedness. Most separate
statements at FERC and the NRC were formal and collegial. While
each Commissioner had his or her own style, many used formal
language common in judicial opinions to note that they “respectfully
dissent” or “respectfully dissent in part.” Opinions at the FCC,
however, can be less guarded.328
325. See supra Parts I.A.1.b, I.B.1.
326. See supra Part I.B.1.
327. See supra Part I.A.1.b.
328. In his partial dissent to the D.C. Circuit opinion upholding the net neutrality rule,
Judge Stephen Williams cited dissenting Commissioner Ajit Pai, but noted that the Commissioner had “us[ed] terms perhaps feistier than would suit a court.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
825 F.3d 674, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The passage to which Judge Williams referred accused the Commission of failing to produce
any actual evidence of threats from paid prioritization. See id. (citing Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5933 (2015) (Pai, Comm’r, dissenting) (accusing
the majority of “anecdote, hypothesis, and hysteria” and calling their examples “picayune and
stale”)).
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Along similar lines, habitual dissents can suggest schisms and
infighting on a commission. While such dissent might simply be the
product of healthy disagreement, repeated failure to reach consensus can signal, rightly or wrongly, that politics rather than expertise
is driving commission decision-making. Regular concurrences might
also impact the commission’s reputation, albeit in a different way.
FCC Commissioners routinely attach separate concurrences to rulemaking decisions.329 This propensity to write separately conveys the
impression of the Commission as a set of individuals, rather than a
unified decision-making body. In other words, although we know
commissions are a “they” rather than an “it,” there can be benefits
to presenting a unified front, especially when dealing with a recalcitrant industry or powerful political opposition.
2. Relationship Costs
Collegiality on decision-making bodies can yield better quality
opinions.330 Yet separate statements can strain relationships between commissioners. Both Guinier and Wood cite the decline of
collegiality and the increase of tension between judges as possible
negative impacts of separate opinion writing.331 Justice Brennan,
too, believed that “[d]issent for its own sake ... can threaten the
collegiality of the bench.”332 If this is true, the culprit is likely to be
the tone of separate statements. Separate statements that are
respectful of the majority may have little impact on collegiality.333
By contrast, a dismissive or openly hostile tone in separate opinions
can create bad blood.

329. The FCC does not use the language of “concurrences,” identifying them only as “separate statements.” However, dissents are clearly designated.
330. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2003) (“[C]ollegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role
of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of differing perspectives and
philosophies to communicate with, listen to, and ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding ways.”).
331. Guinier, supra note 10, at 128; Wood, supra note 10, at 1463.
332. Brennan, supra note 31, at 435.
333. According to Justice Scalia, this is especially true when dissents and concurrences are
the norm. Negative aspersions cast on dissenters will be more likely, in his view, when separate statements are rare. Scalia, supra note 32, at 41 (noting his close friendship with Justice
Brennan, even though the two regularly dissented from each other’s opinions).
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As noted above, even among the small sample of commissions
studied here, tone in separate opinions varied dramatically.334
Without further study, it is not possible to say whether the critical,
sometimes politicized tone in FCC separate opinions is the cause or
effect of the antagonism among Commissioners that has been noted
by others.335 Even if primarily an effect of existing dysfunction,
however, the hostility in many of these opinions can do little to
improve relationships.
3. Resource Costs
Finally, writing separately can strain institutional resources.
Crafting separate statements takes time and effort, pulling commissioners (and their staffs) away from other business. This time is
well spent only if the benefits of writing separately outweigh its
opportunity costs.336 While the costs of separate opinions are immediate, moreover, many of their potential benefits accrue only in
the medium- to long-term.337 Taking the time to craft a separate
written opinion may not be unduly burdensome on the Supreme
Court, which decides in the neighborhood of eighty cases per year,
and where each Justice is assigned four law clerks.338 At an agency
like FERC, however, where the agency issues as many as 5.5 decisions per day,339 time devoted to drafting and issuing a separate
opinion may come at the expense of other commission business.

334. See, e.g., supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, The Increasing Politicization of the FCC, ATLANTIC (Feb. 26,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-increasing-politicization-of-the
-fcc/456579/ [https://perma.cc/Z5YP-Z9YQ] (describing the Commission’s “bad blood”).
336. Even Justice Holmes, the Great Dissenter, acknowledged that dissents were often
“useless.” N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent, I feel bound to do so
in this case.”); see Brennan, supra note 31, at 429 (designating Holmes “the Great Dissenter”).
337. See TUSHNET, supra note 35, at xx (“[D]issents matter, but almost always indirectly
and over a long period.”).
338. The number of law clerks assigned to each Justice has changed over time. See Barry
Cushman, Vote Fluidity on the Hughes Court: The Critical Terms, 1934-1936, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 269, 302 & n.283.
339. This figure is based on estimates from a former Commissioner and is supported by the
number of total annual agency decisions in Westlaw’s database for Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission documents.
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B. Democratic Costs and Benefits
The democratic costs and benefits of separate statements can be
segregated into those relating to the rule of law, accountability, the
quality of public discourse, and civic education and engagement.340
By introducing uncertainty into agency pronouncements, separate
statements can undermine rule of law values. And yet, as discussed
in Part II.A, they can actually enhance agency accountability by
facilitating oversight. As commentators have pointed out in the
judicial context, moreover, dissent can contribute to the marketplace
of ideas and can even fuel citizen participation in the project of
governance.341
1. Rule of Law
If separate statements dilute the authority of majority opinions,342
they might undermine rule of law values such as clarity and settlement.343 For example, if two commissioners on a five-member
commission concur with the outcome in a rulemaking but offer separate reasoning, and one commissioner dissents, it may be unclear
whose logic governs. Regarding settlement, separate opinions can
encourage opponents to challenge the agency decision in court, thus
leading to lengthy legal proceedings that place the future of the
regulation in doubt.344 Even if the regulation is upheld, a split on a
340. While rule of law is not an essential component of democracy in the abstract, it has
become a defining feature of American democracy. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of
Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001)
(identifying “[t]he rule of law [a]s a cornerstone” of our democracy). For a nuanced discussion
of the broader relationship between rule of law values and democracy, see generally Jürgen
Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, 3 EUR. J. PHIL.
12 (1995).
341. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 31, at 430; Guinier, supra note 10, at 47-52.
342. See TUSHNET, supra note 35, at xiii.
343. See Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography, 7 N.Y.C.
L. REV. 391, 420 (2004) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging: One Judge’s
Perspective, 39 FED . B. NEWS & J. 199 (1992) (arguing that dissents should be used sparingly));
see also Wood, supra note 10, at 1463 (noting that dissents detract from law’s clarity).
344. Cf. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 175,
189 (2014) (noting that rulemaking may trigger legal challenges that create uncertainty); Tim
Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1842 (2011) (noting that legal challenges to regulations that result in prolonged uncertainty may be more likely when regulations are “based
on poorly developed facts”). Wu’s argument might be extended to cover regulations whose
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commission signals that a future policy change is more likely.345 If
the law’s legitimacy depends in part on its orderly development,
then separate opinions complicate the picture.346
The extent to which separate opinions undermine certainty and
predictability will depend on their frequency and content. Persistent
dissents,347 especially those involving more than one commissioner,
might undermine the predictability of policy evolution over time,
since a change in personnel or a change of heart by a single commissioner could result in a change in commission approach.348
Especially when the substance of the rulemaking is particularly
controversial, lengthy, detailed, and/or impassioned, dissents might
provide ammunition to parties seeking to overturn the decision.
While these rules will almost certainly be challenged, regardless of
any divisions on the Commission, reviewing courts might be more
sympathetic to parties who are able to cite at least one commissioner in support of their position, potentially prolonging litigation.
It is likely, for example, that the D.C. Circuit would not have been
so sympathetic to the challengers’ arguments in Electric Power
Supply Ass’n v. FERC had Commissioner Moeller not authored such
a lengthy dissent from the underlying rule.349 While the Supreme
factual predicates are well-developed but where commissioners disagree about the import of
those facts. See id. at 1848-50.
345. Such reversals of agency policy are typically upheld by the courts as long as the agency
shows that there are good reasons for the new policy (even if they are not better than the reasons supporting the old one). See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009).
346. See Guinier, supra note 10, at 128. For a more extreme version of this argument,
consider Justice Louis Brandeis’s position that settling a legal principle could be more important than getting it right. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”).
347. Such persistent dissents are not rare in the courts, Fried, supra note 235, at 178
(noting that only explicit commitments to dissent until policies are changed are rare, not persistent dissents themselves), and they occur at commissions as well. Consider FERC Commissioner Bill Massey’s persistent dissents on matters related to FERC’s handling of the
western energy crisis or FERC Commissioner Suedeen Kelly’s persistent dissents on matters
related to the application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to settlement documents. See, e.g.,
regulations cited supra note 173 and infra note 370.
348. Cf. Fried, supra note 235, at 192-93 (examining the special problem of persistent dissenting blocs on a multimember court).
349. 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 136 W. Ct. 760 (2016); see also
supra Part III.B.1.
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Court ultimately overturned the D.C. Circuit’s holding 6-2,350 the
years of uncertainty surrounding demand response’s future in
wholesale electricity markets delayed deployment of at least some
market programs.351 Similarly, the two Republican Commissioner
dissents from the FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking have already
been seized upon by challengers in their efforts to overturn the
rule,352 a task that has become much simpler with the recent appointment of Commissioner Pai, one of the original dissenters, to
lead the Commission.353
2. Accountability
By providing more transparency and insight into institutional
decision-making, separate opinions can facilitate democratic accountability.354 Part II explained in greater detail how separate
statements might facilitate agency oversight by Congress and the
President. But they can also enable oversight by stakeholders and
by the public at large. Guinier has argued that published separate
opinions can make a court more democratically accountable by subjecting more of its reasoning to public scrutiny.355 Thomas Jefferson

350. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016).
351. Some markets, such as ISO New England, delayed full integration of demand response
resources pending the outcome of the litigation. HENRY YOSHIMURA, ISO NEW ENG . INC.,
CONTINGENCY PLAN ADDRESSING THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF FERC JURISDICTION OVER DEMAND
RESOURCES 2 (2015), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/04/iso_paper_
contingency_plan_addressing_potential_loss_of_ferc_jurisdiction_over_dr_04_17_15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7M5-ZL9W] (“[T]he planned June 1, 2017 implementation for full integration of demand response resources ... should be postponed at least a year to allow for more
clarity and direction regarding the future state of demand response.”).
352. See Joint Brief for Petitioners passim, U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1063).
353. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, President Trump Designates Ajit Pai as Chairman of
FCC, FORBES: OPINION (Jan. 22, 2017 12:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldfurcht
gottroth/2017/01/22/president-trump-designates-ajit-pai-as-chairman-of-fcc/332bc411577a
[https://perma.cc/LR2J-KF43].
354. This is especially true because commissioners are uniquely positioned to identify procedural violations within the agencies.
355. See Guinier, supra note 10, at 117-22. Guinier emphasizes that this accountability is
particularly important if the court is “homogen[ous]” and “isolated from sources of innovation.” Id. at 123. Independent commissions may indeed be subject to the former tendency,
if not the latter.
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went further, suggesting that signed, seriatim opinions were the
way to hold life-tenured federal judges accountable to the public.356
Commissioners are not judges, and there are indirect ways to hold
them accountable, including via the political oversight mechanisms
discussed in Part II and through the President’s authority to remove
them for good cause. But separate statements are unique in that
they offer a window into commission decision-making and commissioner preferences. However, not all transparency is created equal.
To serve a useful accountability function, separate statements must
be both comprehensible and available. They must also not occur with
such frequency as to become background noise.
First, in order to enhance commission accountability to the public, separate statements must be comprehensible. They should be
(and typically are) drafted in plain English such that the public can
comprehend their critiques.357 To an even greater extent than judicial separate opinions, commissioner separate statements are often
less formal and far more understandable than the majority decision.
Majority rulemaking decisions are often drafted for technical audiences and are notoriously dense. If certain issues are too technical
for communication to a lay audience, separate statements should at
least be accessible to media representatives who can translate key
ideas for the public.
Separate statements must also be available. Statements that are
embedded in the decision document published in the Federal Register are technically available to the general public. However, the
placement of the separate statements within those documents
matters. Embedding the statements in the middle of a lengthy document, as the NRC sometimes does,358 makes them less visible than
appending them to the end of the document, where they can be
found quickly. Similarly, while the NRC’s transparency in making
earlier-stage decision documents (including earlier-stage separate
statements) available on its website is admirable, these documents
are unlikely to reach a broader audience. For one thing, locating the
documents requires navigating a fairly complex series of links. For
another, the documents are not sorted by rulemaking activity or
356. See Henderson, supra note 32, at 304-07.
357. Cf. Guinier, supra note 10, at 117 (celebrating Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg for
using clear language in their dissents).
358. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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topic, making it difficult to link a particular early-stage decision
document to a published rulemaking decision. Especially when
these separate statements at an early stage in the process substitute for published separate statements from final decisions, accountability functions are less well served if statements are difficult to
locate.
3. Public Discourse and Civic Engagement
Finally, separate opinions can enhance democracy by contributing to the “marketplace of ideas” and by facilitating civic education
and engagement. The “marketplace of ideas” was itself first articulated in a dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v.
United States.359 While Holmes’s conception was relatively narrow,360 the “marketplace of ideas” has grown to stand for broader
conceptions of free and open discourse that are valuable in their own
right and that may help us all to make better choices. Heather
Gerken, for example, emphasizes the “Millian view that exposure to
a wide range of views improves the quality of our decisions.”361
Commissioner separate statements, by providing alternative viewpoints, can enhance the range of available ideas both within and
without the agency. For example, in a dissent from a 2012 order,
FERC Commissioner John Norris highlighted the costs of electricity
reliability standards which would be borne by consumers.362 Norris
noted that he hoped his “comments ... w[ould] help generate a
dialogue on how economics and reliability fit together.”363
The authors of separate opinions might also be seen as modeling
freedom of speech and expression. According to Justice Brennan,
“None of us, lawyer or layman, teacher or student in our society
must ever feel that to express a conviction, honestly and sincerely
359. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”).
360. See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1160, 1166-67 (2015) (suggesting that Holmes was concerned primarily with competition
“among normative moral, ideological, or political programs”).
361. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN . L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2005).
362. See Transmission Planning Reliability Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,686, 26,696 (Apr.
19, 2012) (Norris, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 40).
363. Id.
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maintained, is to violate some unwritten law of manners or decorum.”364 “[W]e encourage debate,” he continued, and “we do not shut
down communication as soon as a decision is reached.”365 Of course,
to the extent that authors of separate statements are indeed modeling discourse, tone matters. Statements that are too dismissive of
their colleagues’ views or overtly disrespectful risk instilling the
wrong kind of values in ordinary citizens.
Finally, concurrences and dissents might also contribute to civic
education and engagement. “Above all,” Guinier reminds us, “dissenting opinions teach.”366 Separate statements can be less formal
in tone and approach than majority issuances, and can speak directly to the citizenry.367 They can also elaborate on possible applications of the majority opinion and on ways in which it might be
distinguished,368 thus providing citizens with more information
about the decision’s likely effects.
Separate statements can play a particularly important educational role when they highlight the rights of the less powerful. W.
Stanfield Johnson has explained that the dissents of Judge Pauline
Newman from the Federal Circuit “respectfully but emphatically
criticize her colleagues for not recognizing legitimate interests of
contractors and citizens seeking remedies from the Government.”369
Some FERC dissents play a similar role in highlighting the needs
of residential energy consumers. In a concurrence attached to a
Commission fact-finding order related to the California energy
crisis, for example, Commissioner Bill Massey highlighted the plight
of the Californian consumers who “paid the exorbitant prices of
California’s dysfunctional market.”370
Not everyone agrees that judicial opinions are effective educational tools.371 The basis for this claim is that the public is largely
364. Brennan, supra note 31, at 437.
365. Id.
366. Guinier, supra note 10, at 58.
367. Cf. Brennan, supra note 31, at 430 (citing his own experience recommending, for
example, that litigants seek redress in a different forum).
368. See id.
369. W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National Policy
of Fairness to Contractors,” 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 275, 276 (2011).
370. Fact-Finding Investigation into Possible Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas
Prices, 102 FERC ¶ 61,108, 61,290 (2003) (Massey, Comm’r, concurring).
371. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 565-69
(2009) (claiming that judicial opinions “[n]either [e]ducate nor [t]each”).
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unaware of either the outcome or the content of judicial decisions.372
Whatever the strength of that claim in the judicial context, it is
more likely to hold true at the agency level in all but the highest
profile rulemakings. Nevertheless, the media, which play a key role
in dissemination of legal developments to the broader public,
already capture administrative dissents. In fact, administrative
dissents make good news because they lend drama to what might
otherwise be dry, technical proceedings. Thus, there is every reason
to think, especially with more media engagement, that separate
statements can enhance civic engagement and public discourse.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to demonstrate that administrative dissents and concurrences are worthy of study in their own right. They
offer insights into independent commission decision-making, reminding us that commissions are in fact collections of individuals,
rather than monolithic entities. They underscore the heterogeneity
of commission processes and cultures. Although separate statements have costs as well as benefits, they play a key role in
bolstering agency accountability and checking administrative
arbitrariness.
More work remains to be done. No single commission appears to
have all of the answers when it comes to the drafting and publication of separate statements. Each demonstrates some best practices and provides some cautionary tales. A helpful first step for
agencies seeking to improve their own practices would be for agency
staff to research the approaches of their fellow commissions. The
FCC has recently undertaken such a project in the wake of criticism
over promulgation of the Open Internet rule, creating a task force
to compare the FCC’s approach to those of other agencies and to
distill recommendations.373 Agencies such as FERC may benefit
from a similar undertaking, if only as a prophylactic. FERC lacks
written procedures on draft circulation, for example, which could
facilitate more dialogic decision-making. There is value in diversity,
372. See id. at 566.
373. See Diane Cornell, Task Force on FCC Process, FCC: BLOG (July 21, 2015, 11:38 AM),
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/07/21/task-force-fcc-process [https://perma.cc/3BY9LXJU].
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and uniformity across commissions could stifle rather than promote
procedural innovation. Nevertheless, the utility of such innovation
is limited if lessons are not diffused across the administrative state.
Academics, too, have a role to play. Countless features of commissioner separate statements remain to be explored. What accounts, for example, for the fluctuating rates of dissent and concurrence over time at individual commissions? Are they the product of
changes in internal culture, including chair turnover? Responses to
exogenous events or docket composition? Commissioner personality?
Something else? Building on the institutional and theoretical work
of this Article, a positive theory of why commissioners dissent could
address all of these questions and more.
The spotlight, of course, comes with dangers of its own, and drawing more attention to commissioner separate statements presents
risks. As noted in Part III, there is the risk of gamesmanship if
courts give separate statements too much weight in reviewing
agency action. Moreover, as the climate in Washington becomes increasingly polarized, commissioners might increasingly be tempted
to use separate statements to signal political commitments and
loyalties. To the extent that these motivations eclipse the substantive, institutional, and democratic benefits outlined here, separate
statements could become more vice than virtue.
And yet, the risk of unintended consequences can be mitigated
and should not deter further inquiry. This preliminary assessment
of administrative dissents and concurrences demonstrates that
commission decision-making is more fractured than the standard
account would indicate. But it is only by embracing the administrative state in all its messiness and complexity that we can truly
understand both its limitations and its possibilities.

